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Articles
THE FUTURE AS HISTORY: THE PROSPECTS FOR
GLOBAL CONVERGENCE IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
John C. Coffee, Jr.*
What forces explain corporate structure and shareholder behavior? For
decades this question has gone unasked, as both corporate law scholars and
practitioners tacitly accepted the answer given in 1932 by Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means that the separation of ownership and control stemming
from ownership fragmentation explained and assured shareholder passiv-
ity.' Over this decade, however, corporate law scholars have recognized
that this standard answer begs an essential prior question: if ownership
fragmentation explains shareholder passivity, what explains ownership
fragmentation? Although the Berle and Means model assumed that large-
scale enterprises could raise sufficient capital to conduct their operations
only by attracting a large number of equity investors, contemporary empiri-
cal evidence finds that, even at the level of the largest firms, dispersed share
ownership is a localized phenomenon, largely limited to the United States
and Great Britain. Not only does the latest comparative research demon-
strate that concentrated, not dispersed, ownership is the dominant world-
wide pattern,2 but in-depth studies of individual countries show that share-
* Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at Columbia University Law School. The author wishes to ac-
knowledge helpful comments and assistance from his colleagues Melvin A. Eisenberg, Ronald Gilson,
Victor Goldberg and Jeffrey Gordon, and also from Merritt Fox, as well as from participants at law and
economics seminars at the Universities of Kansas and Michigan. This Article is intended as a first in-
stallment of the lectures that the author will deliver in early 2000 as part of the Julius Rosenthal Foun-
dation Lecture Series at Northwestern University School of Law.
I See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, JR., THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932). For the first reconsiderations of this thesis, see Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Pas-
sivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520 (1990); Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor
Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 117 (1988).
2 For the fullest discussion of this point and detailed evidence from the 27 principal corporate law
jurisdictions, see Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World (June 1998) (visited
March 3, 1999) <http://nberws.nber.org/papers/W6625> (unpublished manuscript, available on the
Web). This study examines the ownership structure of the largest firms in 27 different countries, those
with the 26 largest Gross National Products and Mexico. Compiling data on the 10 largest publicly
traded nonfinancial companies in each country, the authors found that (i) slightly less than 40% qualified
as widely held, (ii) 30% were family controlled, (iii) 18% were state controlled, and (iv) the balance fell
into different categories not involving dispersed ownership. See id It should be underscored that this
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holder activism increases in direct proportion to ownership concentration.3
As a result, these findings, in turn, suggest that the conventional governance
norms in the United States may be more the product of a path-dependent
history than the "natural" result of an inevitable evolution toward greater ef-
ficiency.
Propelling this new inquiry into whether the Berle/Means corpora-
tion-with its famous "separation of ownership and control"-is the inevi-
table and efficient endpoint of economic evolution, or only the artifact of
political forces and historical contingencies, is the unavoidable reality of in-
creased global competition in both the product and capital markets. As a
result, dispersed and concentrated ownership structures not only differ, but
they may be forced to compete. Although scholars have debated the rela-
tive merits of these rival models for a decade or more, this prospect of an
evolutionary competition-with its implication of a Darwinian "survival of
the fittest" struggle-is very new. Ultimately, the issue thus posed is which
system will dominate, and why: the stock market centered-system of dis-
persed ownership first described by Berle and Means, or the blockholder
and cross-shareholding systems that now prevail across Europe and Asia?
Of course, a clear winner does not necessarily have to emerge. The more
one believes that political forces are likely to constrain and override purely
economic forces, the more one is likely to expect a more muddled and con-
textual outcome. Thus, the current debate has two levels that can often be-
come confused: (1) Which system of corporate governance is superior?,
and (2) Which set of forces--economic or political-is likely to prove more
powerful?
To appreciate this distinction, it is useful to understand that the current
debate has progressed through several discrete stages. First, beginning ear-
study focused only on the very largest firms. Once the threshold is lowered, the extent of concentrated
ownership becomes even clearer. Estimates differ, but the basic picture is the same across a variety of
recent studies. Julian Franks and Colin Mayer found that 85% of large German firms had a shareholder
with. at least a 25% ownership interest. See Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Ownership, Control and the
Performance of German Corporations (April 1997) (unpublished manuscript prepared for a Sloan Con-
ference at Columbia Law School, on file with the author). Another recent study estimates that 64% of
large German firms have a majority owner, while in France the corresponding figure is 59%. See Paul
Windolf, The Governance Structure of Large French Corporations: A Comparative Perspective, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TODAY 695,714 (1998) [hereinafter CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TODAY]. An
even more recent study estimates that 75% of all German listed companies have a majority owner, while
23% had a blockholder group holding in excess of ninety percent of the firm's equity capital. See Tim
Jenkinson & Alexander Ljungqvist, Hostile Stakes and the Role of Banks in German Corporate Govern-
ance, NBER Discussion Paper No. 1695, at 6 (1997); see also discussion infra note 13.
3 For recent commentary on the impact of ownership concentration on shareholder behavior, see, for
example, Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Un-
der Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997 (1994); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control:
The Institutional Investor As Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991); Ronald J. Gilson &
Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and In-
dustrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871 (1993); Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Company Structure
in Germany, Japan and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993).
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lier in this decade, a provocative new wave of law. and economics scholars
advanced "political" theories that explained dispersed share ownership in
large American corporations as the product of political forces and historical
contingencies, not economic efficiency.4 An undercurrent in this criticism
was the theme that political constraints had produced a suboptimal system
of corporate governance, with dispersed ownership implying inherently in-
adequate corporate monitoring. Some of these scholars argued that the An-
glo-American pattern of dispersed ownership was clearly inferior to the
bank-centered capital markets of Germany and Japan, because the latter en-
abled corporate executives to manage for the long run, while U.S. managers
were allegedly forced to maximize short-term earnings.5 Still, with the
burst of the "bubble economy" in Japan, the more recent Asian and Russian
financial crises, and notable monitoring failures by German universal
banks, the tide of opinion has lately turned against the presumed superiority
of banks as monitors. In their wake, some scholars have rediscovered the
advantages of a stock market-centered system of corporate governance,
concluding that it represents a more objective system of external monitoring
that can more quickly compel firms to respond to major changes in their
economic environment.6
More recently, this initial debate about the relative merits of bank-
centered systems of governance versus stock market-centered systems has
expanded to focus on the relationship between a jurisdiction's ability to fi-
nance economic development and growth and its legal system.7 Initially,
scholars started with the question: Why does the size of equity capital mar-
kets vary so extraordinarily across otherwise similarly situated countries?
4 Many of these efforts explicitly stressed that they were "political" theories. See John Pound, The
Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. R v. 103
(1993); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory ofAmerican Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991).
Without question, Professor Roe's work has been the dominant influence in this field and has spurred a
new generation of scholars to search for "political" issues and divisions in the area of financial institu-
tional structure.
5 Michael Porter has long been the leading advocate of this point of view. See Michael E. Porter,
Capital Disadvantage: America's Failing Capital Investment System, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept-Oct. 1992,
at 65.
6 For the strongest recent statement of this view, see Jonathan R. Macey, Measuring the Effective-
ness of Different Corporate Governance Systems: Toward a More Scientific Approach, 10 J. APPLIED
CoRp. FIN. 16 (1998) (arguing that prevalence of hostile takeovers in stock market centered systems en-
sures their long-run superiority over blockholder dominated systems); see also Ronald J. Gilson, Corpo-
rate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327
(1996) (comparing stock market centered versus bank centered systems of corporate governance and
emphasizing roles of industrial organization and path dependency). For an earlier view that bank cen-
tered systems might have efficiency advantages, at least in connection with particular production sys-
tems, see Gilson & Roe, supra note 3.
7 See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); see
also Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Vosislav Maksimovic, La% Finance and Firm Growth, 53 J. FIN. 2107,
2134 (1998) (finding that firms in countries with active stock market and well-developed legal system
were able to obtain greater funds to finance growth).
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Their answer has been that these differences correlate closely with corre-
sponding differences in legal systems. In particular, common law legal
systems seem to outperform civil law legal systems in establishing an envi-
ronment in which securities markets can prosper and grow. For example,
common law countries have on average a ratio of publicly held stock, or
stock held by non-insiders, to gross national product ("GNP") of sixty per-
cent, whereas the same ratio is only twenty-one percent for French civil law
countries and forty-five percent for German civil law countries. 9 Similarly,
while the United Kingdom has thirty-six listed firms per million citizens
and the United States has thirty, France, Germany, and Italy have only
eight, four, and five, respectively.10 Such data understandably fascinates
legal scholars because it suggests a conclusion that financial economists
tend to slight: namely, law matters.
The most convincing explanation for this sharp disparity is that only
those legal systems that provide significant protections for minority share-
holders can develop active equity markets.! Few legal regimes meet this
norm, and hence the United States and the United Kingdom stand apart.
But once this explanation is accepted, it amounts to a rejection of the "po-
litical" theory of American corporate finance offered by Professor Mark
Roe and others. Instead, a rival hypothesis crystallizes to replace it:
namely, dispersed share ownership may be the product not of political con-
straints on financial institutions, but of strong legal protections that encour-
age investors to become minority owners. Absent such protections, most
investors will be reluctant to make equity investments, except to the extent
they can participate in a powerful blockholder group or buy at sharply dis-
counted prices-thereby accounting for concentrated ownership as a pro-
tection against expropriation.'
This Article will examine the implications of this alternative "legal"
hypothesis. Does it provide a better explanation for why powerful financial
intermediaries are observed in Europe and Japan and stock markets in the
United Kingdom and the United States? Does it suggest which of these al-
ternative systems is more likely to be the evolutionary survivor? Or is some
synthesis of both theories possible? In addressing these questions, this Ar-
8 See La Porta et. al., supra note 7.
9 Seeid. at1137.
10 See id.
" This is the explanation given by La Porta et al., supra note 7; see also Andrei Schleifer & Robert
W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997). In addition, it is, of course, pos-
sible that first mover advantages could account for the relative size of stock markets and publicly traded
equity, but in this respect it is noteworthy that some European stock exchanges are older than either the
London or New York exchanges (Amsterdam is generally recognized as the oldest stock exchange).
12 While some investors may be willing to buy at greatly discounted prices, the preference of the
entrepreneurs running the firm will be logically to organize blockholder structures that thereby maxi-
mize the prices they receive for their shares. In short, voting control is the only substitute for legal pro-
tections that enables the firm's founders to maximize the value of the shares they wish to sell.
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title will particularly focus on recent developments within Continental
Europe. Because broad similarities are obvious in terms of the relative de-
velopment and maturity of legal institutions across Europe and the United
States, this focus allows us to concentrate on the most striking difference
between these two economic systems: namely, the structure of share owner-
ship.1 3 In addition, the first destabilizing signs have now surfaced that the
traditional system of concentrated ownership is changing across the Euro-
pean context. Still, where this incipient transition will lead remains contro-
versial. Some predict that increased global competition will force a quick
convergence in corporate governance and structure towards the U.S. pat-
tern.14  From this perspective, increased global competition in both the
13 A good sense of the high level of concentration of corporate ownership in European economies is
provided by a recent detailed survey by the European Corporate Governance Network. See EUROPEAN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NETWORK, THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: A SURVEY OF
SEVEN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (submitted to the European Commission on October 27, 1997) [herein-
after ECGN SURVEY]. For example, in Austria, a survey of the 600 largest firms found that the "aver-
age fractional ownership of the largest shareholder . .. is over 80%." Klaus Gugler et al., The
Separation of Ownership and Control: An Austrian Perspective, in ECGN SURVEY 1. For a world-wide
survey that concludes that family controlled firms remain the dominant pattern worldwide (with state
controlled firms being the second most observed pattern), see La Porta et al., supra note 2. Other recent
studies are discussed supra note 2.
The following table, taken from a recent Dutch study, reveals the fundamental differences in share
ownership patterns between those Continental European countries characterized by concentrated owner-
ship, here, Germany and the Netherlands, and the Anglo-American market centered systems:
Share Ownership (%) Germany NL UK US
-households 16.6 20.0 17.7 50.2
-nonfinancial
enterprises 38.8 9.6 3.1 14.1
-banks 14.2 0.7 0.6 0.0
-investment funds 7.6 1.5 9.7 5.7
-pension fimds 1.9 7.9 34.2 20.1
-insurance companies 5.2 5.5 17.2 4.6
-government 3.4 0.0 1.3 0.0
-foreign shareholders 12.2 54.8 16.3 5.4
Ownership of largest shareholder
greater than 25% 85 - 13 -
greater than 501o 57 22 6 -
See William Bratton & Joseph McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the
Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference (working paper January 1999) (citing CPB
NETHERLANDS, BUREAU FOR ECONOMIC POLICY ANALYSIS, CHALLENGING NEIGHBOURS, RETHINKING
GERMAN AND DUTCH INSTITUTIONS 357 (1997) (table 10.3) (copy on file with the author)).
14 It is impossible to list all the scholars who have made or examined this claim in the 1990s. But
for the earliest prediction of corporate convergence on an international scale that I have found in this
decade, see Roberta S. Karmel, Is it Time for a Federal Corporation Law?, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 55, 90
(1991).
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capital and product markets makes corporate governance simply another
battlefield on which firms must compete or die. The premise here is that
corporate governance differs little from other forms of technology: choose
the wrong form, and if it is important, you will suffer at the hands of com-
petitors who choose a superior form. For others, including this author, cor-
porate governance is more than simply a technology. Infused with politics
and shaped by history, it is not a variable that a firm can simply elect or
contract around. Rather, it is an important constraint that limits and chan-
nels corporate evolution, even in very transitional times.
Viewed from afar, this debate may be reduced to the usual disagree-
ment between neoclassical economists and other scholars over the relative
strength of the forces that shape corporate evolution. At one pole, neoclas-
sical economists have long argued that efficiency considerations ultimately
prevail and determine corporate structure.15 From this perspective, the pre-
diction follows that the increasing globalization of the world's economy
will inexorably compel at least large-scale firms to adopt a common set of
structural characteristics. The boldest of these scholars have even predicted
an "end to history" in the corporate world, paralleling the triumph of the
market economy and democratic capitalism a decade ago at the end the
Cold War.' 6 Under this view, firms that employ a suboptimal system of
corporate governance will be punished by the product and capital markets
until they adapt or disappear.
This view-which this Article will call the "Strong Convergence The-
sis"-is matched by a rival polar position, which sees not competition but
political forces and path dependency as principally shaping and constrain-
ing economic evolution. Consistent with their earlier work, 7 Mark Roe and
Lucian Bebchuk have stressed the importance of path dependency in pre-
dicting the future evolution of corporate governance, arguing that it will
constrain and probably overcome the competitive forces pushing for corpo-
rate convergence.' 8 Even earlier, other scholars have claimed that, regard-
less of whether a more efficient regime of corporate governance could be
demonstrated to exist, inertial political forces would still be sufficiently
15 This theme that efficiency considerations shape corporate structures has a long history. See gen-
erally Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375
(1983); FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
212-18 (1991).
16 See Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law (Nov. 19,
1997) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for a Sloan Conference at Columbia Law School).
17 See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARv. L. REV. 641 (1996)
(arguing that conditions existing at the time when an institution is formed will influence its functioning
far into the future, without respect to efficiency considerations).
18 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance
and Ownership (forthcoming in Stanford Law Review).
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powerful to preserve the less efficient status quo.19 In short, efficiency may
be only a relatively weak force in politically constrained environments.
Between these two rival positions, the third view-that shareholder
dispersion depends on the ability of the legal system to protect minority
shareholders-occupies an intermediate position. It can accept both the re-
ality of evolutionary competition and the inevitability of political con-
straints, but still object that neither side has adequately explained the
exceptional conditions that must exist before truly liquid securities markets
can develop to provide an alternative monitoring force. From its vantage
point, more factors must be introduced to account for the basic global di-
chotomy between dispersed ownership and concentrated ownership. One
critical factor is the desire for liquidity, which inhibits potentially powerful
financial intermediaries from holding large stock positions in individual
companies. 20 From this perspective, even in the absence of political con-
straints, institutional investors would rationally hesitate before investing
their portfolio in a manner that costs them liquidity. Thus, the fact that
powerful financial intermediaries arose in Europe and Japan may be better
explained less by the existence of confining regulations in the United States
than by the absence of deep and liquid equity markets elsewhere. Denied
liquidity by thin markets, financial intermediaries in Japan and Europe ar-
guably had no relevant option other than to hold controlling blocks.
Although this perspective emphasizes liquidity, law remains the critical
variable in fostering the growth of securities markets. From its vantage
point, concentrated ownership becomes the consequence of weak legal
protections for public or minority investors. 21 Starting from the empirical
observation that minority shareholders are subject to exploitation and ex-
propriation in most legal regimes outside the Anglo-American world, this
position postulates that the shareholders' primary protective response to the
risk of exploitation is to invest only through the protective medium of a
substantial block-whether assembled through a family group, a holding
company, or a reciprocal cross-shareholding arrangement. Once these con-
trolling blocks are created, control is often thereafter maintained by a vari-
ety of techniques-stock pyramiding, cross-holdings, supervoting stock-
that permit the control group to retain a majority of the corporation's voting
rights while holding only a minority of its equity, that is, the rights to the
corporation's cash flow. These new studies also suggest that the prevalence
'9 See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Propery Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L. REv. 1145 (1998).
20 See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1281 (arguing that institutional investors' preference for liquidity ex-
plains in part their failure to hold concentrated blocks); see also Amar Bhide, The Hidden Costs of Stock
Market Liquidity, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 31 (1993) (same); Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and Entrepreneurs
in American Corporate Finance, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1997) (same).
21 See La Porta et al., supra note 7, at 1132; see also La Porta et al., supra note 2.
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of such control groups, and their degree of concentration, is greatest to the
extent that the legal protections for public shareholders are the weakest.2
In overview, this "fear of exploitation" explanation for concentrated
ownership is virtually the mirror image of the overregulation hypothesis
that Professor Roe and other scholars have advanced to account for the
seemingly fragmented holdings of American institutional investors.23 Under
their overregulation explanation, political constraints produce suboptimal
corporate governance, and thus dispersed ownership is implicitly seen as
evidence of the law's failure. Conversely, the legal hypothesis views dis-
persed ownership as evidence of the law's success in fostering the trust and
confidence necessary to convince minority shareholders to make and hold
an equity investment. In this latter view, ownership dispersion becomes in-
stead a measure of the achievement of Anglo-American law in protecting
minority shareholders.24 In short, "strong" regulation permits "weak" own-
ers, while "weak" regulation necessitates "strong" owners.
To be sure, all three hypotheses-political constraints, liquidity prefer-
ences, and fear of minority exploitation---could coexist and contribute to a
fuller theory of ownership structure. Nonetheless, while a synthesis is pos-
sible, it should not obscure the inevitability of tradeoffs and tensions. That
dispersed ownership requires a protective legal regime, while concentrated
ownership structures tend to arise in the absence of legal protections as the
default rule, does not ultimately prove the superiority of one system to the
other. From an efficiency perspective, the tradeoff is straightforward: con-
centrated ownership may yield better direct monitoring of management,
while dispersed ownership encourages the development of a more efficient
market with greater liquidity.25 From a normative perspective, the tradeoffs
may be subtler: concentrated ownership probably depends upon blockhold-
ers receiving undisclosed side payments in return for their monitoring
services-often euphemistically referred to as the "private benefits of con-
trol"--thereby resulting both in a less transparent market and likely over-
payments to the controlling blockholders. Conversely, concentrated owner-
ship may free the firm from the obligation to maximize short-run profits
22 See La Porta et al., supra note 7, at 1132.
23 See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN
CORX'ORATE FINANCE (1994); see also Joseph A. Grnndfest, Subordination of American Capitol, HARv.
BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 65.
24 Note that an underlying assumption here is that ownership dispersion is the "natural" state for in-
vestors in recognition of their preferences for liquidity and diversification. This is consistent with the
view taken in Coffee, supra note 3, at 1281.
25 See infra notes 39-56 and accompanying text. In turn, enhanced liquidity is believed to facilitate
investment in longer-run, higher return projects, such as high technology start-ups, that may spur greater
economic growth and productivity. See Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and Eco-
nomic Growth, 88 AMER. ECON. REV. 537 (1998) (citing Valerie R. Bencivenga et al., Transaction
Costs, Technological Choice, and Endogenous Growth, 67 J. ECO. THEORY 53 (1995) and Maurice
Obstfeld, Risk-Taking, Global Diversification, and Growth, 84 AMER. ECON. REV. 1310 (1994)).
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and thus permit both greater stability, greater investment in human capital,
and more attention to the concerns of nonshareholder constituencies.
2 6
These tradeoffs can be endlessly debated, but they may also be highly
transitional, if the forces of corporate evolution are moving us inexorably in
the direction of dispersed ownership. 27 Various scenarios for such a transi-
tion can plausibly be offered, but the most plausible is the following: if
concentrated ownership is attributable principally to the vulnerability of
minority shareholders to exploitation under most legal systems, then those
legal systems that do effectively protect minority shareholders should have
an important competitive advantage in the global marketplace. Given that
stronger legal protections necessarily imply higher stock market prices for
the public, or noncontrolling, shares of such firms, corporations organized
under Anglo-American legal regimes that confer such stronger legal pro-
tections should correspondingly have higher stock market prices and so can
more easily use their equity securities to make stock-for-stock acquisi-
tions.28 If this premise is correct, then companies with "protected minori-
ties" should find it easier to acquire firms organized under other legal
regimes that provide only weaker protections, while the reverse transactions
will be generally infeasible.2 9 Hence, to the extent that mergers become a
necessary path to global scale, firms having higher stock market values for
their minority shares are more likely to be the survivors in any wave of con-
solidations.
This debate over what may happen has not yet shifted to its next pre-
dictable stage: a policy-oriented discussion of the tradeoffs and the most ef-
26 See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
27 A possibly intermediate position should be acknowledged here. Ronald Gilson has predicted that
formal institutional variations in corporate law and practice will remain, but will be overshadowed by an
increasing degree of functional convergence. See Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance:
Convergence of Form or Function (December 5, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for a Sloan
Conference at Columbia Law School). Indeed, it is virtually true by definition that if existing corporate
governance systems possess sufficient plasticity so that their efficiency can be improved within their
existing legal and regulatory parameters, then very different governance systems could exhibit approxi-
mately equivalent performance characteristics. But this position flames more of a question than an an-
swer: is there sufficient plasticity within institutional forms to permit functional convergence?
2 See La Porta et al., supra note 2. This theme is further addressed supra notes 138-48 and accom-
panying text.
29 At the same time, however, weaker legal protections appear to imply higher control premiums to
the controlling shareholder. Much evidence supports the proposition that, under "weaker" legal regimes,
the controlling shareholders will be able to command a greater control premium for their shares. See
Luigi Zingales, The Value ofthe Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience, 7 REV.
FIN. STuD. 125 (1994) (finding a high 82% premium for control blocks on the Milan Exchange, against
an international average of 10 to 20%, and a United States average of 5.24%) [hereinafter Zingales,
Voting Right]; Luigi Zingales, What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes, 110 Q.J. ECON. 1047
(1995) [hereinafter Zingales, Corporate Votes]. Such a disparity seems strong evidence of the relative
value of control and the relative exposure of the minority. However, such evidence also implies that
controlling shareholders outside the United States will resist a premium that could cause U.S. controlling
shareholders to sell.
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fective policy levers by which the law can influence the course and pace of
this transition. The overriding policy question seems obvious: if concen-
trated ownership reflects the vulnerability of public shareholders in most of
the world but may still yield superior monitoring in some contexts, should
legal decisionmakers attempt to facilitate a transition to dispersed owner-
ship? Or, given the difficulty of exporting Anglo-American legal institu-
tions, should regulators recognize concentrated ownership as the logical
equilibrium position for most of the world?
To date, most commentators have approached these questions only
obliquely by assuming that sweeping worldwide legislative reforms are un-
likely. But legislation is not the only route to functional convergence. Al-
though this Article agrees with the path dependency perspective that formal
convergence faces too many obstacles to be predicted, it argues that func-
tional convergence can be facilitated by a much more feasible and largely
voluntary route.30 That route runs through the international securities mar-
kets and, in particular, involves the growing migration of foreign firms to
the U.S. equity markets. Whether through the integration of markets, the
harmonization of standards across markets, or the migration of firms to for-
eign markets, chiefly in the United States or the United Kingdom, a sub-
stantial degree of convergence seems predictable. This is so for a variety of
reasons that ultimately rest on both the need for many firms to grow in scale
in order to exploit global markets and the desire of public shareholders for a
credible commitment from these firms that they will not be exploited.
Initially, this Article will seek to identify the forces at play. Part I re-
views the objections to the Strong Convergence Thesis. In so doing, it em-
phasizes an aspect of the problem that has to date received little attention.
Although U.S. commentators tend to assume corporate mobility and conse-
quent regulatory arbitrage, this assumption rests largely on the fact that an
American business corporation that is dissatisfied with the corporate legal
regime under which it is incorporated can reincorporate fairly easily in an-
other jurisdiction.31 As a result, for most of this century, a vigorous com-
petition has been waged by at least some American states, each motivated
by the goal of maximizing corporate franchise tax revenues, to offer the
most attractive terms for incorporation. Although commentators have dis-
agreed as to whether this competition led to a race to the top or to the bot-
tom,32 the fact of an intejurisdictional competition has-been undeniable,
30 I borrow this rhetorical distinction between "formal" and "functional" convergence from Profes-
sor Gilson. See Gilson, supra note 27.
31 The term "regulatory arbitrage" is a more neutral term for what others call the "race to the bot-
tom," that is, the migration of legal entities to the more lenient regulatory regime, with consequent pres-
sure for regulatory relaxation on all regulators. For the view that migration from incorporation in one
U.S. state to another state is relatively costless, see Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Po-
litical And Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542,586-88 (1989).
32 The original debate was between William Cary and Ralph Winter. See William L. Cary, Feder-
alism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (arguing that competi-
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and this in turn implies relatively free corporate mobility among jurisdic-
tions.
In contrast, most other major industrial nations do not have federal
systems, or at least systems that permit such charter competition to develop
among local jurisdictions, 33 and reincorporation outside the national juris-
diction is generally not permitted. Corporate mobility, at least via the tra-
ditional route of reincorporation, therefore cannot be assumed. Equally
important, to the extent that corporate governance systems outside the
United States frequently seek to promote the interests of nonshareholder
constituencies, these regimes have also sought to prevent attempts to con-
tract around or otherwise escape these norms.34 Thus, a German, French,
Japanese, or British firm does not face the same menu of options as to the
possible legal rules under which an American firm can organize or to which
it can migrate. In turn, the absence of such competition has probably given
the substantive corporate law of these jurisdictions a mandatory character
that contrasts with the more "enabling" style of corporate law in the United
States.
Part II examines other alternatives to reincorporation, with a special
focus on the motives and prospects for migration to foreign stock ex-
changes. Large firms can choose the stock exchange or exchanges on
which they are listed, and in so doing can opt into governance systems, dis-
closure standards, and accounting rules that may be more rigorous than
those required or prevailing in their jurisdiction of incorporation. This pro-
cess of migration may over time prove to be as important as the standard
American interjurisdictional competition for corporate charters. In theory,
migration should give rise to a form of regulatory arbitrage, under which
tion for charters produces a race to the bottom); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection
and the Theory of the Firm, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-62 (1977) (arguing that competition produces a
race to the top). Judge Winter's views have been more fully articulated by Professor Roberta Romano.
See Roberta Romano, Corporate Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, I J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985). In contrast, Professor Lucian Bebchuk has emphasized the likely diver-
gences between the incentives of managers and shareholders with the resulting prospect that charter
competition could produce at least marginally inefficient outcomes. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federal-
ism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1435 (1992). Besides the debate over efficiency, the other major approach in this literature has
been to relate regulatory competition among the states to an interest group theory of the states' real in-
terests. For a leading effort, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward An Interest-Group
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987).
33 Although Australia and Canada are also federal systems, competition for corporate charters
among their provinces does not appear to be vigorous. See Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Com-
pete? The Casefora Competitive Corporate Law Market, 36 MCGiLL.J. 130, 150 (1991). Within the
European Community, only a constrained form of competition is possible, as minimum standards, set
forth in directives issued by the Council of the EU bind all members states. See sources cited infra notes
82-89 and accompanying text.
34 German courts have struck down a variety of efforts perceived by them as attempts to contract
around codetermination. See Mark J. Roe, Codetermination and German Securities Markets, 1998
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 167.
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firms seek to play one legal regime against another by threatening to mi-
grate to less "regulatory" jurisdictions. Yet, the most visible contemporary
form of migration seems motivated by the opposite impulse: namely, to opt
into higher regulatory or disclosure standards and thus to implement a form
of "bonding" under which firms commit to governance standards more ex-
acting than that of their home countries.
3 5
Part III turns to the prospects for functional convergence. If institu-
tional forms and legal rules are resistant to change in part for reasons ana-
lyzed in Part I, what degree of convergence in corporate norms can arrive
through migration and securities market harmonization? Here, this Arti-
cle's essential claim is that the experience of American corporate legal his-
tory is likely to be replayed on the international stage. That experience, as
here interpreted, is for variations in local corporate law to persist but to be
overshadowed by the relative uniformity in the federal law applicable to se-
curities markets. Thus, while the law of Delaware may differ from that of
California, these differences have been effectively marginalized by the de-
gree to which the federal securities laws force disclosure of fiduciary mis-
conduct and provide special remedies by which to reduce agency costs.
Correspondingly, as the law applicable to securities markets is either
globally harmonized or as foreign issuers migrate to list in U.S. markets and
so become subject to U.S. standards, the variations between the corporate
laws of, say, Germany and Italy may persist, but their relative importance
should decline. Thus, precisely in those contexts where the large block-
holder in Europe or Asia has the greatest discretion to act to its own advan-
tage and to the minority's disadvantage, the application of U.S. securities
law, or some "harmonized" model largely based on it, would instead im-
pose transparency and significantly constrain opportunism by controlling
shareholders.3 6 This special focus of the federal securities laws on con-
straining the controlling shareholder explains not only why the competition
among American states for co, orate charters has not produced great diver-
gences in U.S. corporate law, but also why the existing and often great di-
vergences among the corporate laws of other nations might not impede
movement toward convergence at the securities markets level. By no
means, however, will concentrated ownership patterns disappear. Rather,
the likelihood is for different markets to become specialized in trading the
securities of different types of firms, with dispersed ownership firms trading
principally in markets in the United States and the United Kingdom.
35 See infra notes 107-128 and accompanying text.
36 Others have asserted that this function of reducing agency costs is the historic and most important
goal of the federal securities laws. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to
Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1047-51 (1995).
37 The latest evidence suggests that American corporate law is relatively uniform, whether despite
or because of interjurisdictional charter competition. See William J. Carney, The Production of Corpo-
rate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 715,728 (1998); infra notes 223-32 and accompanying text.
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Finally, this Article argues not only that a high degree of convergence
can emerge through corporate migration and stock exchange harmonization,
but that convergence at this level is far more politically feasible than at the
level of corporate law reform. This is both because of the common interest
of all participants in securities market harmonization-coupled with the
corresponding fear of exclusion-and the extraterritorial reach of American
law. Because American securities law will be applicable to most firms that
grow through mergers and acquisitions to achieve global scale, it will simi-
larly constrain-at least at the margin-the ability of controlling sharehold-
ers and blockholders to engage in conduct long permitted under local law.
In this view, the U.S. securities laws should achieve what corporate law
cannot easily do: namely, accommodate functional convergence-both
through migration and harmonization-so as to raise, rather than lower,
governance and disclosure standards. Ironically, such an outcome is pre-
cisely the opposite of what regulatory arbitrage is usually thought to pro-
duce.
The other side of the coin on this issue of political feasibility involves
the major looming downside on the contemporary horizon: the prospect for
backlash.38 Although it tends to be assumed that convergence will simply
promote efficiency, the possibility also exists that there will be a counter-
reaction to the perceived domination of corporate governance by American
forms and norms. Once again, however, this Article will argue that the
prospect for backlash can be significantly reduced to the extent that corpo-
rate governance is chiefly implemented through securities market integra-
tion rather than through mandatory corporate law reform.
I. THE BARRIERS TO CORPORATE CONVERGENCE
Most observers today believe that an active monitoring board, staffed
by outside directors with substantial and varied business experience, is a
critical element in corporate governance and has contributed to the relative
efficiency of the American business corporation.39 Why then do not the
forces of global competition in both the product and capital markets impose
similar governance structures on the boards of Japanese, German, and
French corporations? Answers can be grouped under the following head-
ings.
38 On this theme, see generally Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1998).
39 For a recent consensus statement of this view and an attempt to provide empirical support for the
proposition that such a board increases corporate efficiency and market value, see Ira M. Millstein &
Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Cor-
poration, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283 (1998). But see Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard S. Black, Board Compo-
sition and Firm Performance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TODAY, supra note 2, at 291, 292 ("no
convincing evidence" exists that finns with majority-independent boards perform better than firms with-
out such boards).
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A. Rent-Seeking and the Persistence of Inefficient Rules
Even if a particular governance structure would make firms relatively
more efficient, it is not necessarily in the interest of all groups in society to
modify existing law to permit or require such reforms. Political coalitions
within a country may have an interest in maintaining existing legal rules,
even if they are inefficient. The history of takeover regulation in the United
States provides an obvious example, as individual states have sought, with
some success, to chill hostile takeovers for firms incorporated within their
jurisdiction. Even though such legislation may penalize shareholders, those
shareholders are typically not residents of the local jurisdiction-indeed,
more than half of the shares of the typical large, public corporation in the
United States are owned by institutional investors. Such out-of-state share-
holders will have little, or at least less, impact on legislative outcomes
within that jurisdiction.
More generally, shareholders seem the classic example of Mancur Ol-
son's "inchoate group, )AO namely, a group that, although large in number, is
not well organized and hence has less ability to influence political decisions
than smaller but better organized groups such as labor or corporate manag-
ers. Olson later extended this theory to suggest that interest group coali-
tions could produce national decline by blocking efficiency-enhancing
reforms. The recent inability of Japan to adopt needed banking reforms or
of Russia to stabilize its economy--each in the face of a world-wide con-
sensus that reforms were needed-seem to illustrate the blocking power of
entrenched groups that, even at the cost of national paralysis, are able to
stall reforms that would adversely affect them.
Next, add to this pattern the political reality that the power of labor
seems today stronger in the European than in the American context. A use-
ful example is supplied by the 1997 surprise hostile attempt by Krupp, the
German steel and engineering group, to take over its larger rival, Thyssen.
The bid "sent shock waves through corporate Germany and caused political
outcry ... [and] triggered heated worker protests."4' Thyssen's unions or-
ganized demonstrations that at one point brought as many as thirty thousand
demonstrators out in protest-protests that were focused at not only Krupp
but also its politically more vulnerable investment adviser, Deutsche
Bank.42 Ultimately, the hostile bid was abandoned, and political leaders in
Germany brokered a long-term consolidation and merger between the two
40 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1965). Olson later extended his theory to show how interest groups could (and would) main-
tain inefficient rules in place even at the cost of national decline. See MANCUk OLSON, THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROwTH, STAGFLATION AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982).
41 See Survey--German Banking and Financing 98: A Unique Perspective, FIN. TIMES, June 24,
1998, at7.
42 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Deutsche Telekom, German Corporate Governance, and the Transition
Costs of Capitalism, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 185,200.
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firms, which is scheduled to be completed in 1999. Critical to this com-
promise was the reduction of threatened job losses.
4 3
Although coalitions of labor unions and target firm managers have
sometimes goaded state legislatures in the United States to adopt rushed
antitakeover legislation in response to hostile bids, no parallel exists in
modem United States history in which a takeover battle has required the
intervention of national political leaders in order to avert social disorder.
Indeed, in the United States, although there are "Rust Belt" jurisdictions
that are extremely skeptical of takeovers for fear of job loss and injury to
local communities, there is also Delaware, home to more than one half of
the largest U.S. corporations, which has always been skeptically resistant to
claims that corporate law should reflect or protect the interests of nonshare-
holder constituencies. Given its federal system, the United States is a
mixed bag, with some jurisdictions that will, and others that will not, seek
to frame their corporate laws to protect nonshareholder interests.
In contrast, European corporate law has long protected nonshareholder
interests at the national level. The clearest, but not the only example of
such a policy is codetermination, which in its German form requires that
half of a large firm's supervisory board be made up of employee represen-
tatives. Commentators have long opined that codetermination cripples the
German board as a monitoring body. Even if the actual impact of codeter-
mination can reasonably be debated, the policy is deeply rooted in German
law and supported by a strong coalition of labor and employee interest
groups. Predictably, these interest groups will not be moved by the claim
that such a legal rule reduces the value of the ownership interests in a Ger-
man firm. Rather, their interest as employees lies in minimizing job loss,
which, at least over the short run, codetermination may achieve.
Why does corporate governance rank high on labor's agenda in Europe
but not in the United States? Although a number of historical reasons could
be discussed, the critical economic fact is that labor is less mobile in Europe
than in the United States. If employment prospects are brighter elsewhere,
U.S. workers can migrate from New York to California at relatively low
cost, but a German worker cannot as easily move to Italy or Great Britain.
Language and culture are important constraints. Even after the Common
Market, Europe is criss-crossed by national borders that, as a social matter,
restrict the mobility of labor. Hence, labor is more resistant to corporate
migration in Europe than in the United States. In contrast, U.S. workers,
being more mobile, behave as if they had less need for unions and in fact
join them at a lower rate.
Even given greater labor rigidity in Europe or Asia, the neoclassical
economist might still reply that over the longer run the market will still
punish a firm whose corporate governance system gives any significant
voice to nonshareholder constituencies. Predictably, such a governance
43 See id.
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system will raise the cost of capital to its subject firms and render them less
able to compete with firms with superior corporate governance systems.
There are several practical answers to this response.
First, the political ability to modify or update inefficient legal rules in
any country may ironically decline precisely as capital markets become
more complete in that country. Assume, as a simplifying assumption, that
today, German firms are basically owned by German shareholders, with
relatively few foreign investors owning shares in German corporations; as a
result, the cost of inefficiency largely falls on German citizens, who have
every incentive to pursue political means of redress. But as capital markets
become more global, the largest German firms will become increasingly
owned by a homogenized class of institutional shareholders, most of whom
will be non-German. This is probably already true for a very few German
firms, such as Daimler-Benz. At this point, the increasing lack of overlap
between shareholders and citizens has political implications. On the sim-
plest level, German citizens have increased incentive to vote to maintain in-
efficient legal rules that protect local jobs to the extent that the costs of such
action fall increasingly on foreign shareholders. Indeed, this fact pattern
parallels that of an American Rust Belt state, whose state legislature votes
to bar takeovers to protect local jobs, in part because the shareholders
thereby injured do not reside or vote in that jurisdiction. Much like institu-
tional shareholders in the United States, foreign shareholders understanda-
bly tend to avoid local political controversies. The one important difference
between the two contexts is that the American firm could ultimately migrate
from the jurisdiction to a more takeover "friendly" state if its shareholders
insisted. Such flight is not possible from a nation if, as is typical, the corpo-
ration's laws do not permit it to reincorporate abroad.
Economic self-interest is not the only force at work in resisting corpo-
rate convergence. National cultural traditions, nationalism, and xenopho-
bia-always strong political forces-may also play a role here. One can
imagine French citizens with no other interest in the topic voting against
laws that would reform French corporate governance-simply because they
were suspicious as a general matter of the Anglo-American model of any-
thing. Here, history truly matters.
The neoclassical economist may well concede that such a political re-
action could persist for a time but will still question whether it will continue
once local firms begin to fail. Once the firm's competitors begin to surpass
it because of their access to lower-cost capital, the fear of economic failure
may motivate even labor to agree to modify inefficient legal rules. Implicit
here, however, are several debatable assumptions. First, this model implic-
itly assumes that other forces acting on the firm and its competitors will re-
main equal. Yet, political forces within the particular country may seek to
protect the failing firm. The legislature could adopt protectionist trade poli-
cies or otherwise seek to hobble more efficient competitors, perhaps by re-
stricting plant closings or layoffs within its borders. Although such efforts
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may just cause the more efficient competitor to move its plants outside that
country's borders, the reality of transportation costs and logistical problems
suggests that such efforts could shelter the noncompetitive firm within a lo-
cal zone of relative safety. More importantly, the domestic firm subject to
the inefficient legal rule may search for second-best substitutes that reduce
the significance of its competitors' superior corporate governance technol-
ogy. In the case of codetermination, it has been reported that German firms
have adapted to it by employing alternative measures, including informal
meetings between the management board and large stockholders. The use
of such substitutes, even if marginally inferior, in turn reduces the incentive
for shareholders to pressure or lobby for change.
To generalize, corporate evolution is likely to follow the path of least
resistance. Thus, Professor Gilson has predicted the persistence of formal
deviations from the governance norms that one observes in the United
States or the United Kingdom, but he still foresees a functional convergence
that is sufficient to achieve competitive equivalence and maintain the local
firm's cost of capital at a basically comparable level.44 Functional conver-
gence may well trump formal convergence, but the open question that his
analysis leaves unresolved is how far functional convergence can proceed
before it encounters inflexible legal barriers. When these barriers are en-
countered, the problem here noted is that the globalization of capital mar-
kets actually increases the disconnect between economic ownership and
political representation. In turn, this dissociation disables shareholders
from becoming effective political actors. Concomitantly, globalization may
increase the competitive pressures for convergence, but it also may heighten
some of the political barriers to convergence.
B. Control Premiums and the Risk of Expropriation
To this point, we have focused largely on legal rules and the prospect
for rules convergence. Yet, not all (or even most) inefficient corporate gov-
ernance practices are legally mandated. Nontransparent accounting, passive
boards, and self-dealing transactions are never truly required, and firms by a
variety of techniques could credibly promise to end such practices. For ex-
ample, by listing on the New York Stock Exchange and adopting by-laws
requiring an activist audit committee, a firm might credibly signal that it
would no longer engage in certain types of transactions that expropriated
wealth from minority shareholders.
Still, it may not be in the interest of those who control the firm to make
such a commitment. To illustrate, assume hypothetically that the conse-
quence of such a reform package would be to increase the stock market
capitalization of the firm from $90 million to $100 million, or more than ten
percent. At first glance, this would seem to benefit those in control of the
44 See Gilson, supra note 27.
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firm. But, on closer inspection, the answer is indeterminate. Suppose a
control block (possibly, owned by a family) of this firm has received and
declined a recent offer of $50 million for its one-third block. This offer
does not truly imply that the value of the firm as a whole is $150 million;
rather, it implies only that the value of the control block, under a particular
set of legal and institutional arrangements, is at least $50 million. The fact
that this offer was declined also implies that, regardless of any synergy
gains that the buyer foresaw, the control holder saw greater value in its
control block. The stock market's seeming original valuation of this firm at
$90 million before the adoption of the reform package may only be its
valuation of the two-thirds of this stock in the hands of dispersed public
shareholders, which the market therefore valued at $60 million. The re-
maining control block could therefore be worth $50 million or more, im-
plying a total firm value of at least $110 million or more.
Hence, when we say that the stock market capitalization of the firm
will rise from $90 to $100 million, this may really imply only that the
adoption of the corporate governance reforms will simply increase the value
of the two-thirds of the firm's stock in public hands from $60 million to $70
million. But these same reforms might reduce the value of the control
block, hypothetically, from $50 million to $40 million or less. On this zero-
sum assumption, which is, of course, not the only possibility, the de facto
control group would have little interest in adopting these reforms. Only a
Coasian bribe from the public shareholders or from a third party could in-
duce the control block to adopt such reforms. In short, to the extent that
corporate governance reforms increase the value of publicly held shares by
reducing the value of a control block, there may be little movement in this
direction. This would remain true even if the gains to the public sharehold-
ers more than offset the loss to the control block holders.
This point has a generalized significance, because a well-known eco-
nomics literature has shown that the average size of control premia is larger
in those economies characterized by concentrated ownership and weak mi-
nority protections.45 This difference in the typical size of control premia
cannot logically be attributed to differences in the relative prospect for syn-
ergy gains, which is usually the preferred explanation for control premiums,
because the potential for these gains is greater in economies having the
more active mergers and acquisitions markets-which the United States and
the United Kingdom certainly have. Rather, the more logical explanation is
that the ability to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders is greater
in those countries having on average higher control premiums. This con-
clusion is reinforced by the finding reached by Professors Shleiffer and
Vishny that civil law countries provide significantly weaker protections for
minority shareholders than do common law countries. 6 Similarly, a 1997
41 See zingales, Voting Right, supra note 29; Zingales, Corporate Votes, supra note 29.
46 See La Porta et al., supra note 7, at 1132; Sehleifer & Vishny, supra note 11.
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report prepared for the European Commission identifies the discretionary
powers given to the controlling shareholder as the central characteristic of
Continental corporate law that most differentiates it from American corpo-
rate law and practice. Against this backdrop, the greater control premia in
civil law jurisdictions reflects the lesser likelihood that courts will intervene
to protect minority (or public) shareholders -from actions by the control
holder that either seek to eliminate the minority at a less-than-proportionate
value or to otherwise transfer wealth to the control holder.
If this is the case, the difficulties in changing this pattern are formida-
ble. As opposed to simply revising inefficient corporate legal rules that
may have an uncertain future impact, this type of reform effects a present
wealth transfer from the controlling shareholder to the public shareholders.
In addition, the law must not only be changed, it must be enforced. To give
minority shareholders the realistic expectation that corporate wealth will not
be diverted to those in control of the firm, it is necessary'to create adequate
enforcement mechanisms and a much stronger judiciary. Those who paid a
control premium at midstream in the corporation's life to gain control will
resist such a change fiercely, sincerely believing that they purchased the
right to eliminate the minority at a discount off proportionate value. Corre-
spondingly, they may also claim that because the public shareholders pur-
chased at a "bargain" price which reflected the likelihood of future wealth
expropriation by the controlling shareholder, the public shareholders would
receive an undeserved "windfall" if legal rules were revised to entitle them
to a proportionate share of corporate assets and distributions. From an effi-
ciency perspective, it may be clear that the economy will do better if the
minority is protected, but from a normative perspective, the respective enti-
tlements of the majority and the minority can be debated endlessly.
C. Complementarity
The foregoing point about the ubiquity of patterns of concentrated
share ownership in much of the world leads to a more general observation:
what is efficient in one context may not be efficient in another, especially if
reforms are implemented on a piecemeal basis. Any specific corporate
governance practice-for example, the majority outsider board-is embed-
ded in a broader institutional matrix, including a characteristic ownership
structure. Thus, a particular practice or legal rule probably can only be effi-
cient in any given context if it is compatible with the other practices, in-
cluding ownership structure, that prevail in that context. To illustrate,
consider whether it would be efficient for a firm based in an Asian country
to adopt an American-style monitoring board of outside directors when the
firm's major competitors had management teams and boards largely staffed
with personnel having close contacts with the government then in power.
47 See ECGN SURVEY, supra note 13.
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Even if one does not rely on the perhaps overly cynical assumption that
"crony capitalism" prevails in much of the world, it could still be true that,
in an economy characterized by cross-ownership and a preference for deal-
ing (either as a lender, borrower, supplier, or customer) with established
trading partners, it would be useful to have a board populated by represen-
tatives of such trading partners and economic allies. In short, having an in-
dependent board when other firms are using their boards to knit together a
closely linked web of interlocking alliances may be a counterproductive in-
novation. Innovations, even if copied from a well-recognized model, must
be able to adapt to local conditions if they are to survive. In turn, this re-
quires that even a potentially efficient reform fit into the complicated jigsaw
puzzle of existing institutional arrangements, and this implies that corporate
evolution needs to be gradual and incremental, because most abrupt muta-
tions do not survive.
D. Path Dependency
Much national variation in corporate governance reflects the impact of
path dependency upon the evolution of economic systems. Although a
complex concept, the core idea in path dependency is that initial starting
points matter. Whether established by historical accident or political com-
promise, initial conditions direct an economy down a particular path of de-
velopment from which there is no easy return. Possibly the best known
example of path dependency producing an outcome that is seemingly ineffi-
cient is that given by Professor Roe: the relatively small scale of financial
intermediaries in the United States seems in substantial part to be the con-
sequence of a U.S. political tradition that was profoundly skeptical of con-
centrated financial power.4  Much smaller than their European and
Japanese counterparts, both proportionately to domestic GNP and in abso-
lute terms, U.S. financial institutions were dwarfed by the interaction of a
federal system that long denied banks the ability to spread beyond a single
state, and by a populist distrust of concentrated financial power that resulted
in part in the Glass-Steagall Act's divorce of commercial and investment
banking. The upshot was a proliferation of local financial intermediaries in
the United States that were too small and too legally constrained to serve as
effective monitors of U.S. industrial corporations.
Nor is the United States unique. Political compromises, sometimes in
long-forgotten battles, resulted in the lifetime employment system in Japan
and codetermination in Germany. Neither practice appears to be an effi-
cient adaptation,49 but both have persisted.
48 See ROE, supra note 23.
49 Some have argued that the system of lifetime employment in Japan created a desirable incentive
to invest in human capital, but the most recent review doubts that the practice had such an impact and
finds that the actual motivation was to reduce worker influence in the factory and to minimize the pros-
pect of socialist electoral victories in post-war Japan. See Ronald Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Lifetime Em-
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The important implication of path dependency is that, once events have
been set in motion and historical forces have produced significant national
variations in the structure and design of economic institutions, there may be
no universal answer to the question of what incremental changes are most
efficient. Indeed, the same market forces could produce inconsistent evolu-
tionary adaptations in different economic environments. A good illustration
of this possibility has been suggested by Professor Jeffrey Gordon. He be-
gins with the fact that "thin" equity markets in Germany have not generated
significant equity capital for German corporations (at least in percentage
terms), and that German corporations have consequently placed greater reli-
ance on debt financing. 50 But his real point is that a natural "fit" exists be-
tween reliance on debt and a system of bank monitoring. In a heavily
leveraged firm, he observes, Anglo-American-style corporate governance
would not work well. Indeed, the standard corporate finance literature rec-
ognizes that in such a world, if corporate control were assigned to a board
of directors responsible only to the shareholders, perverse incentives would
arise for the equity shareholders to pursue inefficient strategies (from the
standpoint of the firm as a whole) that transferred wealth from the creditors
to the equity. Professor Gordon's point is not that bank monitoring is in-
herently superior to monitoring by equity representatives, but that the opti-
mal answer to the monitoring problem is contingent on the characteristic
capital structure that firms in a particular economic environment have. If
the starting point is heavy reliance on debt, for any of a number of exoge-
nously determined reasons, then the optimal governance solution is unlikely
to be the characteristic Anglo-American one of a board responsible only to
its shareholders. Instead, financial structure and governance structure must
be jointly determined. If path dependent factors predetermine the issue of
financial structure, then governance structure becomes the dependent vari-
able. In turn, the prospect of convergence towards a single system of cor-
porate governance begins then to look increasingly remote.
E. The Possible Superiority of Blockholder Governance
The most subversive possibility has been held for last. Although con-
centrated ownership aggravates a host of normative problems and inher-
ently produces both a thin and nontransparent securities market, it may
yield better monitoring of management. Large blockholders are inherently
superior monitors than dispersed shareholders, because dispersed share-
holders are subject to a free rider problem: small shareholders lack the in-
ployment: Labor Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance (forthcoming in the Co-
lumbia Law Review).
So Gordon, supra note 42, at 196.
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centive to incur monitoring costs that primarily benefit other shareholders.51
Blockholders will rationally incur larger costs, given their larger ownership.
Unfortunately, controlling blockholders are also able to engage in private
rent-seeking that benefits themselves as management, but not other share-
holders. For some scholars, this combination of superior monitoring and
private rent-seeking represents an efficient solution. They argue that con-
centrated ownership essentially subverts blockholder monitoring "by per-
mitting blockholders to reap private benefits through self-dealing and
insider trading. '52 The problem with this rationale is that there is little as-
surance that this subsidy is cost-effective; rather, the remedy of blockholder
"monitoring" may be worse than the disease of managerial opportunism.
Worse yet, in many forms of concentrated ownership the blockholder is a
family group, and the line between the blockholder "monitor" and the man-
agement team, which may also involve family members, often breaks
down. 3 On such occasions, minority shareholders may experience the wor-
st of both worlds: self-dealing blockholders who overlap with a family-
based management.
Market-centered systems clearly make a more determined effort to re-
strict such private rent-seeking by blockholders. 54 But, at least as a theo-
retical matter, it is unclear whether the greater ability of a market centered
system to police conflicts of interest fully compensates for its lesser ability
to monitor for inefficiency. Further, it can at least be argued that market-
centered systems tend to be characterized by inefficient pressures to maxi-
mize profits over the short term 5 and by an inability to protect firm-specific
investments in human capital by managers.5 6 In principle, these tradeoffs
are indeterminate, at least in the absence of better empirical data. This Ar-
ticle will argue, however, that, even if the optimal structure of corporate
51 For example, even a large institutional investor holding 1 to 2% of a firm's stock must recognize
that 98% of the benefit of any gains that flow from its monitoring efforts will be enjoyed by other share-
holders. For an 80% blockholder, however, this is a less serious problem.
57 See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 13; see also Milhaupt, supra note 19, at 1179-84.
53 The extreme example is probably Italian corporate governance which relies on small family held
firms and has minimized the role of outside investors. See Jonathan R. Macey, Italian Corporate Gov-
ernance: One American's Perspective, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TODAY, supra note 2, at 677, 692
(noting also that Italian economy "is dominated by small efficient family firms"). French corporate
governance also seems to be characterized by "an interpenetration of kinship structures (family owners)
and managerial bureaucracy." See Windolf, supra note 2, at 695.
5 Revealingly, Germany uses the last major financial marketplace to prohibit insider trading, and it
did so two years late in complying with an EU directive requiring such a prohibition. See Roberta S.
Karmel, Transnational Takeover Talk-Regulations Relating to Tender Offers and Insider Trading in
the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1133, 1149-52
(1998).
55 See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 13, at 8.
56 See id. at 9; see also Arnold W.A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, Objectivity, Control and Adapt-
ability in Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TODAY, supra note 2, at 213, 214-15
(1998). This latter problem is a corollary of the greater frequency of hostile control consists in market
centered systems.
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governance cannot therefore be confidently stated, the instability of the
blockholder system can be predicted for reasons that are next addressed.
I. THE MECHANISMS OF CORPORATE CONVERGENCE
Although the foregoing discussion has stressed the barriers to conver-
gence in corporate governance, significant legal and economic transitions
are clearly in progress. Some involve changes in the governance structure
of economies formerly characterized by concentrated ownership and a reli-
ance on bank monitoring; other transitions involve the decisions of individ-
ual firms to migrate abroad and to opt into foreign governance standards
through either listing agreements or initial public offerings ("IPOs"). Most
importantly, the pace of change is very uneven. As will be seen, much
more progress has been made towards convergence at the level of securities
regulation than at the traditional level of corporate law and structure. The
possible reasons for this disparity will be assessed after recent develop-
ments are first reviewed.
A. The Growth of European Stock Markets
European stock markets have traditionally been regarded as "thin"--
that is, both illiquid and volatile.57 The traditional pattern has been one of
relatively few IPOs on either an annual basis or based on the jurisdiction's
population. Typically, local stock market capitalization has amounted to no
more than a small percentage of gross domestic product ("GDP"). For ex-
ample, Germany has Europe's largest economy and GDP, but in 1995 just
three issuers accounted for a third of the trading volume in German equity
markets, and the top 'six issuers accounted for nearly 50%.58 Similarly, the
ratio of total stock market capitalization to GDP contrasts sharply between
Germany and the United Kingdom. In Germany, stock market capitaliza-
tion was 17% of GDP, but the corresponding ratio was 132% in Great Brit-
ain.59 In the United States -in 1995, the stock capitalization of the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE") and NASDAQ were, respectively, 80.4% and
16.5% of U.S. GDP, or nearly 87% in total.60 Nor is the German situation
unique. For Italy, the corresponding 1995 ratio of stock market capitaliza-
57 See Gordon, supra note 42, at 187; Marco Pagano et al., Why Do Companies Go Public? An Em-
piricalAnalysis, 53 J. FIN. 27 (1998).
58 See Peter Gumbel, Cracking the German Market: The Hard Sell, Getting Germans to Invest in
Stock, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1995, at A4.
59 See Gordon, supra note 42, at 196 (citing study by Theodor Bauns, a German law professor); see
also The 1996 Guide to Germany, EUROMONEY, June 1996, at A4 tbl. 1 (for 1995, 23.9% for Germany,
130.7% for Great Britain).
60 See Roberta S. Karnel, Italian Stock Market Reform, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 20, 1998, at 3.
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tion to GDP was 19.3%.61 More importantly, almost no Italian companies
were publicly held. 62
From a path dependent perspective, the anemic status of German stock
markets is easily explained by an obvious "interest group" explanation:
banks do not want rivals and so retard the growth of the securities industry.
The power of the banking industry is particularly strong in Germany, and
thus one would expect it to keep securities markets underdeveloped, par-
ticularly for smaller businesses that would have to depend on bank financ-
ing. The problem with this logical story is that its validity is rapidly
waning. The German financial landscape is in rapid transition, and there is
already a "widespread sentiment among political actors that the system of
bank-centered finance is hindering German economic development.' 6
Several recent privatizations, most notably of Deutsche Telekom in 1996,
have been aimed at developing a "shareholding culture" among German
citizens.6 Across Europe, both 1997 and 1998 have been years of record
IPO activity, and the approaching arrival of an eleven nation "Euro zone" is
widely expected to spur further increases in trading volume and probably
result in a true pan-European equity market.65 Although much of this activ-
ity has been the product of large privatizations of formerly state-owned
firms, a closer look at the data reveals that the majority of the new offerings
(in dollar volume) in 1998 have been corporate offerings, not privatiza-
tions.6 6 This means that firms that typically have been privately held within
families for many years have opted to sell minority stakes to the public in
this new environment.67
Particularly noteworthy has been the success of the German Neuer
Market, a new small company market, patterned after NASDAQ's small
capitalization market, to attract listings by start-up companies.68 Over the
last year, it has tripled its listings to forty-three. 69 Although venture capital
and entrepreneurial start-ups have long been absent from the German and
61 See id.
62 As of 1989, only seven Italian corporations had offered more than 50 % of their shares to the
public, and in five of these, voting control remained locked in a small family group. See Macey, supra
note 53, at 687-88.
63 Gordon, supra note 42, at 186-87.
6 Id. at 186.
65 See Thane Peterson et al., The Euro's Warm-Up Act: IPOs, BUS. WEEK, June 22, 1998 at 24
(noting that new share offerings exceeded $91 billion in 1997 on European exchanges, a record level,
and may exceed this in 1998).
66 See id. (noting that 53% of the $31 billion in new offerings in 1998 have been corporate offerings
unrelated to privatizations).
67 See id. (discussing success of the Neuer Market).
68 See Thane Peterson, A High-Tech Europe Is Finally In Sight, BUS. WEEK, Aug. 31, 1998, at 120
(noting also that this market was up 150% in 1998).
69 See id. Several of these listings appear to have done IPOs in the United States and then listed on
the Neuer Market. See Graham Bowley, A Success Worth Replicating, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1998, at 21
(discussing Quiagen, Germany's first biotech startup).
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Continental landscape, they now appear to be making a vigorous appear-
ance.
The pace of change has been even more dramatic in Italy. Italian cor-
porations have typically been family-controlled and have raised capital
through bank loans and retained cash flow. But between 1995 and 1997,
the ratio of the capitalization of the Italian Stock Exchange to Italian GDP
rose from 19.3% to 31.3%, an increase of more than 50%.70 Behind this
rise lie two important developments: (1) a major privatization program,
which began in 1993 and which was impelled in large measure by the desire
of the Italian government to reduce budgetary deficits in order to qualify for
the European Monetary Union, and (2) major changes in the laws governing
the Italian securities industry, partly in order to comply with a European
Community Investment Services Directive that was designed to encourage
cross-border competition among securities firms.71 Until well into this dec-
ade, there were ten separate stock exchanges in Italy (although the Milan
exchange was by far the dominant market), each operating as an "open out-
cry" trading floor with little regulation. Over the past two years, they have
been consolidated into a single computerized market, which is now pri-
vately owned and operated as a for-profit company, and regulated by the
Commissione Nazionale per la SocietA e la Borsa ("CONSOB"), an SEC-
like administrative agency. A 1991 legislative reform also authorized the
formation of securities firms (where previously only natural persons could
qualify for stock exchange membership). It also established capital re-
quirements, and restricted conflicts of interest.
The development of European securities markets has been partially fu-
eled by a liberalization of cross-border activities by securities firms. The
Investment Services Directive authorized all European Union ("EU") secu-
rities firms to conduct cross-border operations anywhere in the EU based
only on the license issued by their home state. 2 Thus, well-capitalized
British firms or subsidiaries of American firms licensed to do business in
Britain can now enter the Italian market, or any other EU market with lim-
ited capital, and add liquidity.
The last chapter in the Italian story is perhaps the most relevant to this
Article's concerns. In 1998, Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi pushed a
package of reforms through the Italian Parliament that increased disclosure
standards, strengthened the regulatory powers of CONSOB, and revised
Italian corporate governance to increase protections for minority sharehold-
70 See Karmel, supra note 60, at 3.
71 See Manning G. Warren III, The European Union's Investment Services Directive, 15 U. PA. J.
INT'L BUS. L. 181 (1994). The "Investment Services Directive" is more technically referred to as Coun-




NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ers.73 Chief among these governance reforms was a provision that required
a mandatory takeover bid by any person or group who acquires thirty per-
cent or more of a publicly listed company. This provision, which roughly
parallels British and French law, is both a paradigmatic example of rule
convergence and a protection designed to reduce the ability of insiders and
others to assemble control blocks cheaply. Press accounts noted that the re-
form was intended to discourage a common Italian phenomenon: "covert
alliances of shareholders who own less than fifty-one percent of the share
capital between them."74 Other reforms halved from twenty percent to ten
percent the required percentage of shares necessary to call a special meeting
of shareholders and otherwise enhanced proxy voting.75 Equally important,
a proposal that business groups advanced was rejected which would have
protected large firms from hostile takeovers by denying any hostile bidder
the ability to cross the fifteen percent threshold without making a full public
offer.
Of course, it remains to be seen whether these protections will prove
adequate to assure minority shareholders, but one measure of success has
been the upsurge in Italian IPOs. It is estimated that there will be more than
twenty-five IPOs in Italy in 1998, almost double the number in 1997.76
More generally, an IPO boom spread across Europe in 1998, with the
demand for IPO shares regularly outstripping the supply.77 Although this
rosy scenario for increased European IPOs has since been clouded by the
Russian financial crisis, 7 some factors encouraging the growth of European
equity markets seem likely to persist: (1) across Europe, a significant num-
ber of major privatizations-particularly in the telecommunications field-
are planned and in the pipeline, thus assuring a continuing supply of IPOs
and a probable increase in the aggregate European stock market capitaliza-
tion;79 (2) the adoption of the "Euro" as the common currency unit in early
1999 will facilitate pan-European equity trading and the cross-listing of
shares on multiple exchanges; (3) corporate governance reform, including
both greater protections for minority shareholders and increased financial
73 See Alan Friedman, Prodi Rolls Out Reforms, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 19, 1998, at 1.
74 James Blitz, Italian Takeover Reforms Take Shape, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 12,1998, at 2.
75 See id.
76 See Karmel, supra note 60, at 3. There had been at least 17 such IPOs as of mid-August 1998.
See id.; see also Deborah Ball, New Entrepreneurs Fuel IPO Bonanza in Italy, WALL ST. J., July 22,
1998, at B7A (estimating that another five hundred private Italian firms could qualify for stock exchange
listing).
77 See Suzanne McGee, Europe's IPO Game May Get Tougher, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1998, at CI
(noting that "it became almost routine for new stock issues to be sold well above the price range at
which they were marketed. Issues have been outseribed tenfold routinely, and many rally in after-
market trading").
78 See id.
79 See McGee, supra note 77, at CI (noting approaching major privatizations in Switzerland, Po-
land, Greece, and France).
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transparency, has proved to be popular with the center-left political coali-
tions that today hold power in a number of European states;80 and (4) EU
regulation will continue to fight local protectionism and seek to open up se-
curities and financial markets to cross-border competition. Whatever the
short-term movements in financial markets, all these forces are likely to
produce increased competition and convergence.
The foregoing developments have been emphasized at some length be-
cause they fly in the face of the conventional wisdom. That wisdom held
that active stock markets could not easily develop in economies long or-
ganized around strong banks. Thus, a path dependency theorist could logi-
cally predict that opposition from banks would stifle any potential
competition from stock exchanges. Nonetheless, the recent evidence shows
that securities markets are developing and convergence at this level is oc-
curring, even in the face of a mature banking industry. Possibly, this is be-
cause European political leaders have recognized that the development of
securities markets robustly correlates with future economic growth!' If so,
at least within this context, the proponents of the claim that competition will
force convergence seem currently to have the better of the argument with
the proponents of path dependency.
B. Disclosure Harmonization versus Corporate Law Reform
For more than a decade, the European Community has pursued har-
monization of its securities regulation and disclosure rules in order to
achieve a common market for securities.82 In principle, harmonization can
be pursued by one of two alternative approaches: reciprocity or commonal-
ity. Under the former approach, all member states agree to recognize and to
permit use of a disclosure document that qualifies in the issuer's home
country, while under the latter, common rules and disclosure documents are
so See Friedman, supra note 73 (noting that corporate governance and financial transparency reform
seem to be issues that are particularly attractive to center-left coalitions in Italy and possibly Holland
and Sweden).
81 See Kent Hargis, Do Foreign Investors Stimulate or Inhibit Stock Market Development in Latin
America, 38 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 303 (1998) (reviewing literature); Levine & Zervos, supra note 25;
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 559
(1998). These studies do not demonstrate the superiority of securities markets over a banking system as
an engine of growth, but they do suggest that securities markets stimulate investment in longer term and
higher risk projects (such as high technology investments) that have a higher return over the long run.
82 For overviews of this process, see generally Uri Geiger, Harmonization of Securities Disclosure
Rules in the Global Market-A Proposal, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785 (1998); David Reid & Andrew
Ballheimer, The Legal Framework of the Securities Industry in the European Community Under the
1992 Program, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103 (1991); Andreas J. Roquette, New Developments Re-
lating to the Internationalization of the Capital Markets: A Comparison of Legislative Reforms in the
United States, the European Community, and Germany, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 565 (1994); Manning
G. Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Achievements of the European Communi-
ties, 31 HARV. INT'L LJ. 185 (1990) (describing the development of the disclosure system in the Euro-
pean Union).
93:641 (1999)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
agreed upon. Harmonization in the EU has largely compromised these two
approaches: a single disclosure document can be used for the offering of se-
curities in any member state, so long as the disclosure requirements man-
dated by the issuer's home country satisfy EU-mandated minimum
standards.8 Beginning in 1979, the EU has adopted a series of securities-
oriented directives governing (1) the minimum requirements for the admis-
sion of securities for trading on a stock exchange in any EU member state,
(2) the minimum disclosure requirements for securities offerings in any
member state, and (3) periodic reporting requirements.8 Alone, these steps
represent substantial convergence at the level of securities regulation, al-
though member states remain free to impose more stringent requirements
upon domestic issuers.
While these directives addressed traditional areas of securities regula-
tion and did not attempt to harmonize corporate law norms, the European
picture changes dramatically once the focus shifts from securities regulation
to traditional corporate law. Attempts by the European Union during the
1980s to adopt directives dealing with takeover bid procedures, board
structure of publicly held companies, and employee rights have all largely
failed amidst considerable controversy. 85 In general, either Great Britain
would object to attempts to place employee representatives on the corporate
board 6 or Continental countries would object to attempts to generalize the
British takeover rules. By 1997, an expert panel reported that cultural atti-
tudes differed so fundamentally within Europe on these questions that at-
tempts to develop a harmonized single standard were destined to fail.87
This tendency for harmonization efforts to become controversial once
the focus shifts to substantive corporate law continues to date. In October
1998, efforts to draft a takeover directive again ended in deadlock, as the
United Kingdom's Takeover Panel valiantly resisted the proposed draft.88
The takeover directive may yet be salvaged,89 but possibly at the cost of
framing it in extremely generalized and nonconfining terms. To some ex-
tent, this has been the prior history of corporate control directives in the
83 See Geiger, supra note 82, at 1788-89.
84 See Geiger, supra note 82, at 1789-90; Reid & Ballheimer, supra note 82, at 124.
85 For reviews of these efforts, see generally Terence L. Blackburn, The Societas European: The
Evolving European Corporation Statute, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 695 (1993); Amir N. Licht, International
Diversity in Securities Regulation: Roadblocks on the Way to Convergence, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 227,
239-40 (1998).
86 See Proposal for a Fifth Directive, Foundation Article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty Concerning the
Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Powers and Obligations of Their Origins, 1983 O.J.
(C240) 2. This draft proposed two optional structures for providing employee representation, but both
encountered intense British opposition.
87 See Corporate Governance Update, 5 CORP. GOVERNANCE INT'L REV. 256 (1997).
88 See Jane Martinson, Takeover Directive in Deadlock, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 9,1998, at 2.
89 See More Talks on Defining Takeovers Bids Directive, EUR. REP., Jan. 9, 1999, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, cumws file.
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European Union. While the takeover in the United States has functioned as
a device for downsizing oversized and inefficient conglomerates, the Euro-
pean Union's Acquired Rights Directive severely limits the ability of a bid-
der to lay off excess employees or reduce wages in the wake of an
acquisition. ° Hence, whatever the fate of the current takeover directive, the
hostile takeover may never play the same disciplinary role in Europe that it
has in the United States. Again, this softening of the takeover's potential
impact reflects the greater political power of labor across Europe and the
more powerful legacy of the European social welfare state.
The line between corporate law and securities regulation is fuzzy at
best, and it is revealing that proposals which have fallen into the gap be-
tween these two fields have encountered considerably more opposition than
have pure disclosure proposals-but they have still been adopted. A good
example is provided by the Transparency Directive 9' Less an attempt at
harmonization of existing legal rules than a bold attempt to adopt a new rule
that would require public disclosure of the often very nontransparent own-
ership structures that characterize the European system of concentrated
ownership. Issued in 1988 by the Council of Europe, the Transparency Di-
rective was intended "to increase investors' confidence in securities mar-
kets" by assuring equivalent disclosure of control data about listed
companies.92 Similar in scope and spirit to the Williams Act in the United
States, the Transparency Directive applied to listed firns registered any-
where in the European Union. Basically, it required any natural person or
legal entity to notify the issuer and the local governmental authority within
seven calendar days after the person or entity's voting rights exceeded or
fell below any of the following thresholds: ten percent, twenty percent, one-
third, half, or two-thirds. Local law was permitted to vary these standards
only slightly. In addition, the Transparency Directive recognized the reality
of control groups by requiring the aggregation of voting rights within a
business group or pursuant to a formal shareholders agreement or proxy ar-
rangement. Informal groups were not, however, covered.93
How successfully has the Transparency Directive been implemented?
Much depends on one's perspective, but the results have clearly been un-
even. Prior to the directive, German corporate law required disclosure only
when an individual's or entity's stake exceeded twenty-five percent. Thus,
the Transparency Directive did mandate a significant change. But, reveal-
ingly, the effort to implement the Transparency Directive set off a pro-
90 The Acquired Rights Directive of 1977 has been implemented by legislation in many EU member
states. In Britain, the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Act codifies its obligations.
Essentially, on a transfer, the employee staffmust be transferred on the same or better terms. For a brief
summary, see What the TUPA means for you, GUARDIAN, Dec. 5, 1998, at 18.
91 See Council Directive 88/627 of December 12, 1988 on the Information to be Published when a
Major Holding in a Listed Company is Acquired or Disposed of, 1988 O.J. (L. 348) 62.
92 See ECGN SURVEY, supra note 13, at 56-57.
9' See id. at 87-90.
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longed political battle in Germany. While the directive was supposed to
have been adopted by local legislation by 1991 (and was in many other
European countries), Germany did not adopt conforming legislation until
1994, in part because the very idea of transparency in ownership structure
aroused controversy and disrupted long-held assumptions about the right to
anonymity.
94
This struggle has carried over into the compliance stage. A 1997 study
of the implementation of the Transparency Directive by the European Cor-
porate Governance Network criticized the implementation of the Transpar-
ency Directive across Europe9 5 and concluded "that the Directive, at the
moment, fails to achieve its objectives. 96 A variety of predictable prob-
lems were identified: the compliance efforts of some member states were
not adequate; too little disclosure was provided concerning the block-
holder's intent and plans; informal groups escaped coverage; and the data
that was reported was often inaccessible to shareholders.97
Fairness requires the balancing observation that some progress has
been made. Some states-most notably Italy and Belgium-have exceeded
the Transparency Directive's minimum requirements. For example, owner-
ship disclosure in Belgium is now required at the five percent level or three
percent if the company so chooses. Such disclosure must be filed within
forty-eight hours, is checked by a governmental agency, and is made pub-
licly available in an on-line database accessible to investors that is run by
the stock exchange.98 Similarly, Italy now requires that equity holdings of
more than two percent in listed companies must be reported to CONSOB
within forty-eight hours, and the data is also made available to the public
through an online computer system.99
Why has securities harmonization largely succeeded, while corporate
law harmonization has been largely frustrated? A variety of reasons can be
given: (1) disclosure harmonization sounds neutral and technocratic and
does not on its face challenge long-established social policies; (2) securities
harmonization is necessary for the development of a pan-European stock
market and cross-listings, which are in the common interest of most issuers;
and (3) securities harmonization can be largely accomplished at the admin-
istrative level and does not require national legislatures to act, thereby in-
viting political rivalries to enter the picture. Still, as the more controversial
experience with the Transparency Directive shows, considerable resistance
94 See Marco Brecht & Ekkehart Bohmer, Transparency of Ownership and Control in Germany, in
ECGN SURVEY, supra note 13, at 23 (noting "clash of cultures" over issue oftransparency).
9s See id. at 57.
96 See id.
97 Id. at 90-92.
98 See Marco Becht, Ownership and Control in Belgium, in ECGN SURVEY, supra note 13, at 13-
18.
99 See Marcello Binachi et al., Ownership Pyramidal Groups and Separation Between Ownership
and Control in Italy, in ECGN SURVEY, supra note 13, at 13-14.
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has arisen when the law has sought to change the behavior of individuals-
shareholders and families-or to change a long established cultural tradi-
tion-the desire for ownership anonymity. Thus, both sides in the debate
over corporate convergence are correct, but at different levels.
C. The Appearance oflnstitutional Investors
Although banks play a major role in some European securities markets
(most notably Germany), other institutional investors, such as pension funds
and mutual funds, have historically played no more than a minimal role on
the European Continent. The absence of pension funds has been largely at-
tributable to generous public pension systems across Europe. But this pat-
tern has begun to change. In 1993, Italy passed its first legislation to
regulate pension funds, a statute that was amended in 1995. A more liberal
tax law was also passed to encourage their formation. Following the
American model, Italian pension funds may not hold more than five percent
of the voting shares of any listed company (ten percent in the case of non-
listed companies) and may not acquire "direct control" of a company.
Similarly, Italian law restricts open-end mutual funds to parallel five per-
cent and ten percent ownership ceilings and also prohibits their acquisition
of control. Whatever the wisdom of these provisions, they promise a new
form of fragmented shareholding: small block holders. In turn, such share-
holders are both exposed to exploitation and motivated to seek protections.
The development of pension funds in Europe still faces significant ob-
stacles. In September 1998, fund management associations from six Euro-
pean countries united to seek relief through the European Community from
investment restrictions placed on pension fund equity investments by local
law, most notably in France and Germany.1°° Arguing that existing restric-
tions on equity investments "have a significant detrimental effect on the de-
velopment of European-funded pensions [and] on the European
economy, '10 1 they called for the substitution of an American-style "prudent
man principle" that would leave asset allocation decisions up to fund man-
agers. A preliminary draft of a pension fund directive is expected to en-
dorse this idea but to encounter opposition from the French and German
governments.'02 Again, this confrontation not only parallels the American
experience, it also frames another test case for the convergence hypothesis.
Path dependency theorists and neoclassical economists would probably
make different predictions about the eventual outcome of this battle, but it
is already significant that a draft directive liberalizing investment restric-
tions is under serious consideration.
Given continued growth, these institutional shareholders may come to
play an activist role similar to that played by their Anglo-American cousins.
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The key difference is that they will function for the foreseeable future in a
concentrated ownership environment where small blockholders have less
power. If they are unlikely to be powerful enough to change local law, they
might still pressure their portfolio firms to secure foreign exchange listings
and utilize the protections available to them under foreign law.
D. The Harmonization of International Accounting Standards
In July 1995, the International Accounting Standards Committee
("IASC"), a private international organization, and the International Or-
ganization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO") reached an agreement to
develop a core set of international accounting standards ("IAS") with the
expectation that on completion of this project IOSCO would endorse these
standards for use in cross-border financings and for listings in global stock
markets.0 3 A draft is now expected this year. Obviously a response to the
globalization of the world's securities markets, this effort, if successful,
would eliminate the need to reconcile an issuer's financial statements in its
home jurisdiction's format with those of the jurisdiction(s) in which it
wished to seek financing.
The IASC has already published some thirty standards dealing with a
broad array of accounting topics, and the harmonization effort faces only
modest obstacles on the European scene. But the willingness of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to accept IAS standards for use in
the United States remains a more problematic and unresolved issue. In
April 1996, the SEC issued a statement that supported the IASC's efforts
but that also specified rigorous criteria that would have to be satisfied be-
fore such standards could be used without reconciliation in the United
States.1°
The SEC's reservations appear to stem mainly from domestic con-
cerns: if it permits foreign issuers to issue securities in the United States
based on even marginally relaxed financial standards, can it long deny U.S.
issuers the same ability?' °5 Will it be seen as placing U.S. issuers at a com-
petitive disadvantage by subjecting them to a more costly regulatory bur-
den? As sensitive as this problem is for the SEC, it probably affects only
when and not whether IAS standards will become usable without recon-
103 See David Mercado, Evolving Accounting Standards in the International Markets, in
INTERNATIONAL SECuRITIES MARKETS 1996, at 345, 346 (1996) (PLI No. B4-7166); see also Glenn
Reiter, International Securities Offerings: Recent Developments And Current Issues, in 29TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION (1997) (PLI 134-7206).
104 See Mercado, supra note 103, at 419 (Exhibit C) (setting forth the SEC statement, which was not
issued as a formal release).
105 My colleague Louis Lowenstein has argued that the SEC will be under intense pressure to relax
standards for domestic issuers if it lowers standards for foreign issuers. See Louis Lowenstein, Finan-
cial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
1335, 1338 (1996). The counterargument is that institutional investors may force both foreign and do-
mestic issuers to disclose more information than the SEC requires.
Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance
ciliation in the United States.10 6 For the European issuer, even if the SEC
accepts IAS standards, another unresolved question involves whether such
an issuer can as a practical matter use this lesser standard of disclosure in
the United States. Will securities analysts and institutional investors de-
mand more?
In any event, the swift movement toward accounting harmonization in
Europe again reveals that some forms of convergence do not encounter
cultural obstacles or political resistance. Indeed, private lawmaking by
standard-setting groups such as the IASC seems to largely sidestep obsta-
cles that legislative efforts normally encounter.
E. Migration to Foreign Markets
In principle, it is not strictly necessary to reform local law in order for
functional convergence to occur. Instead, firms seeking any of a variety of
goals-to raise equity capital, to increase share value, or to make acquisi-
tions for stock-may decide to list on a foreign stock exchange and thereby
opt into foreign governance standards.
The number of foreign listings on the principal U.S. exchanges reveals
the extent of this international migration. As of the end of 1996, there were
416 foreign listings on NASDAQ, 305 on the New York Stock Exchange,
and 63 on the American Stock Exchange, for a total of 784.107 This number
continues to grow rapidly. From 1992 to 1998, the foreign listings on the
New York Stock Exchange more than tripled, from 119 to 361.108 In addi-
tion, as of 1996, the London Stock Exchange had 533 foreign listings, al-
though many of these were undoubtedly U.S. films.0 9  Of the thirteen
thousand companies now registered with the SEC as "reporting" compa-
nies, it is estimated that more than one thousand are foreign.!10
The accelerating pace of this migration may seem surprising when one
realizes that foreign issuers incur extensive regulatory costs when they enter
the U.S. markets and that most have never thereafter made securities offer-
ings in the United States.' Why then do they list? Arguably, companies
106 Some predict that the SEC will cross this bridge by no later than 2002. See Paul Pachter, Inter-
national Accounting Standards: The World's Standards By 2002, 68 CPA J. 14, 15 (1998).
107 See Amir N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International Securities Regulation in A
World Interacting Securities Markets, 38 VA. J. INT'L. L. 563, 566 (1998).
'08 See Greg Ip & Gregory L White, Big Board Is Hoping Daimler Chrysler Drives In More For-
eign Primary Shares, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1998, at Cl; see also Gerard Achstatter, Foreign Companies
Flock to the U.S. But Their Stocks Carry Extra Risks, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, June 2, 1998 at A-7
(noting 50% rise in foreign listings from 1995 to 1998).
109 See Licht, supra note 107, at 566.
11 See Geiger, supra note 82, at 1786 (citing data from Office of International Corporate Finance of
the SEC); see also Pachter, supra note 106.
1 While foreign issuers list, they seldom make primary offerings in the United States. This may
be attributable to a fear of the litigation remedies that they would face in the United States under the Se-
curities Act of 1933 or to the additional accounting requirements of the SEC when a foreign issuer seeks
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in smaller markets gain liquidity and possibly also some international rec-
ognition and prestige from a U.S. listing. But greater motivation probably
lies in the finding, repeatedly observed by financial economists, that the an-
nouncement of a dual listing on a U.S. exchange by a foreign firm typically
increases the firm's share value." 2 This may also seem surprising because
entry into the. U.S. securities markets may force the issuer to revise its pre-
viously reported earnings downward, as happened to Daimler-Benz."'
One explanation for the abnormal price movement on a U.S. listing is
that such a listing represents a bonding mechanism: the foreign issuer is in-
creasing the share value of its public shares by agreeing to comply with the
generally higher disclosure standards that prevail in the United States."
4
Some evidence supports this interpretation, as opposed to the explanation
that dual markets simply increase the demand for the stock, because other
studies have found that when a U.S. issuer lists abroad on a foreign ex-
change, the opposite occurs: its shares exhibit negative abnormal returns."
5
to register securities for sale (in which event the SEC requires not simply reconciliation to U.S. Gener-
ally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") but full compliance therewith).
112 See Licht, supra note 107, at 634-35; see also, Gordon Alexander et al., Asset Pricing and Dual
Listing on Foreign Capital Markets: A Note, 42 J. FIN. 151 (1987); Gregory Kedlec & John McConnell,
The Effect of Market Segmentation and Illiquidity on Asset Prices: Evidence from Exchange Listings, 49
J. FIN. 611 (1994).
113 When Dainler listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 1993, it was required to restate its
1992 annual earnings to comply with U.S. GAAP standards. It had reported a gain of DM 615 million
to its shareholders, but was required to restate this as a loss of DM 1,839-or a swing of nearly DM
2,554. See Pachter, supra note 106, at 14. Obviously, this turnaround can both embarrass management
and cause uncertainty for investors and thus represents a deterrent to a U.S. listing. Nonetheless, foreign
firms continue to list at an increasing rate.
114 Professor Edward Rock has studied the IPO process in Israel, which typically involves a "high-
tech" start up company in Israel listing on NASDAQ as an integral part of the offering process. He con-
cludes that an "unappreciated function of the U.S. mandatory disclosure regime is the extent to which it
permits issuers to make a credible commitment to a level and permanence of disclosure." See Edward
Rock, Mandatory Disclosure As Credible Commitment: Going Public, Opting In, Opting Out and Glob-
alization, at 2 (Oct. 14, 1998) (unpublished manuscript). In essence, this is the same bonding thesis. See
also Asher Blass et al., Corporate Governance In An Emerging Market: The Case of Israel, 10 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 79, 86-89 (1998) (finding that high quality Israeli IPOs listed on NASDAQ, while
lower quality offerings listed on Tel Aviv Stock Exchange and that portfolio investors tended to invest
in the former offerings, but not the Tel Aviv offerings). Such self-segregation again seems to support
the bonding thesis.
115 See Licht, supra note 107, at 634. One study even finds that foreign firms that had listed only
their depositary receipts in the bulletin board market in the U.S. experience significant positive returns
when they upgrade from this OTC market to the NASDAQ market and, as a consequence, become "re-
porting!' companies subject to the SEC's mandatory disclosure system. See Darius Miller, Why Do For-
eign Firms List in the United States: An Empirical Analysis of the Depositary Receipt Market (1996)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (cited in Licht, supra note 107, at 634). The impor-
tance of this finding is that these issuers had already overcome market segmentation by establishing an
ADR facility, but had not yet become subject to U.S. mandatory disclosure rules. See SEC Rule 12g3-
2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2 (1998) (providing exemption for such foreign issuers upon filing of home
country financial statements). Thus, the upgrade isolates the impact of the differential between SEC re-
porting requirements and home country requirements.
Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance
This negative movement may be because the market expects that the for-
eign listing will facilitate undetectable insider trading on the foreign ex-
change or other conduct impermissible in the United States.
The migration of foreign firms to the United States represents more
than isolated decisions by individual firms. In some economies, resort to
the U.S. capital markets appears to be a standard stage in a firm's economic
development. The clearest example of this pattern has been the extraordi-
nary phenomenon of Israeli firms effecting IPOs on NASDAQ. By some
estimates, more than one hundred firms incorporated in Israel are now listed
on the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ or the American Stock Ex-
change;1 6 of these, more than seventy are high-tech companies.1 7 In ef-
fect, in the words the NASD's chief executive officer, NASDAQ has
become "a capital-raising engine for the Israeli economy."118 Despite the
small size of the Israeli economy, only Canada of all foreign countries has
more listings on U.S. exchanges. 9 Interestingly, this process has occurred
almost entirely in this decade. Nor is the Israeli experience entirely unique.
From 1991 to 1997, international equity issuances in the United States have
grown at a twenty-six percent annual rate. ° Mexican firms and those of
several other Latin American countries have also made IPOs in the United
States.121
The Israeli pattern is particularly interesting because it shows reality
behaving in exactly the opposite manner that the academic conventional
wisdom had predicted. Academic commentators have generally predicted
that competition among national securities disclosure regimes would invite
"regulatory arbitrage" or, in more vivid terms, a "race to the bottom," as is-
suers played one system against another.12 Yet the Israeli pattern shows
that the interaction among different legal regimes can be complementary.
Indeed, Israeli securities law in some important respects has been intention-
ally integrated with U.S. securities laws in order to facilitate joint U.S.-
116 See Ira M. Greenstein and Lloyd Harmetz, U.S.-Israel Transactions Present Unique Issue, N.Y.
L.J., Apr. 27, 1998, at S2.
117 See Richard Rappaport, Beating Their Swords Into 1PO Shares, FORBES ASAP, June 1, 1998, at
93.
118 See US. NASDAQ Wants Share of Israeli Privatization, REUTER EUR. BUS. REP., Apr. 16, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws file (quoting Frank Zarb, chief executive officer of the
NASD).
119 See Rappaport, supra note 117, at 93. Some 12 Israeli IPOs were effected in 1996 in the United
States, more than those of any other foreign country.
120 See Pachter, supra note 106. In 1997, foreign registrants raised $28 billion in U.S. capital mar-
kets-16 times the 1990 level. See id.
121 For example, in 1997, TV Azteca effected a $650 million IPO (as part of a privatization) through
Bear Steams. See Robinson, Year End Review: Latin America Markets, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG.,
Jan. 12, 1998, at43.
122 See Licht, supra note 107, at 635-36 (making this point that prior commentary had focused only
on competition among different legal regimes and overlooked the possibility of complementary and
mutually reinforcing interaction).
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Israeli securities offerings. Market integration may itself represent an im-
portant form and measure of convergence.
The Israeli experience also underscores that some firms migrate to the
U.S. markets because it is infeasible to effect an IPO in their own country.
This difficulty may again reflect the lack of sufficient minority legal pro-
tections to attract equity investors in their country.' 2 If the lack of minority
legal protections did chill the ability of start-up firms to effect IPOs, it
would follow that larger and older firms with established reputations could
access the equity capital markets through IPOs. Interestingly, the available
data seems to confirm this prediction. One recent study found that the av-
erage newly listed company is "much older and larger in Italy than in the
United States." Specifically, this study concluded that "[t]he typical Italian
IPO is 8 times as large and 6 times as old as the typical IPO in the United
States. ' 124  Nor is the Italian experience unique. For Italy, from 1982
through 1993, the average age of companies that went public was thirty-
three years.25 In fact this was better than the overall average for European
companies engaging in IPOs, which another study has computed at forty
years. 26 Both figures contrast sharply with the U.S. experience, where
venture capital-backed firms go public after an average period of five
years.
127
What explains this age differential between the United States and
Europe? Given that the transaction costs of an IPO appear to be roughly
comparable, the most obvious and logical explanation is that the relative
absence of legal protections for minority shareholders makes it more diffi-
cult for young companies to win the trust and confidence of investors.12 8
Older companies have higher reputational capital, which enables them to
compensate for the shortfall in legal protections.
F. The Need for Global Scale
Besides the desire to increase their stock price, other, more powerful
reasons may explain the interest of foreign corporations in listing on a U.S.
securities exchange. The decision by Daimler-Benz, A.G. ("Daimler") to
list on the New York Stock Exchange in 1993 and to comply with very dif-
ferent accounting requirements that greatly reduced its reported earnings
123 Controlling premiums in Israel appear to be the second highest in the Western world (second to
only those in Italy), thereby suggesting that minority protections are limited. See Ronald Lease et. al.,
The Market Value of Control in Publicly-Traded Corporations, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 439 (1982); Macey,
supra note 53, at 684.
124 See Pagano et al., supra note 57, at 61.
125 See id. at 36. In the U.S., venture capital backed firms go public after an average period of five
years. See id.
126 See Kristian Rydqvist & Kenneth Hogholm, Going Public in the 1980"s: Evidence from Sweden,
I EUR. FIN. MGMT. 287, 309 (1995).
127 See Pagano et al., supra note 57, at 36.
128 Forjust this explanation, see Pagano et al., supra note 57, at 29.
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now comes into focus as a prelude to Daimler's 1998 acquisition of Chrys-
ler Corporation in what was essentially a stock for stock exchange. Had
Daimler been traded only in Germany in a much less liquid market and
subject to less transparent disclosure requirements, the acquisition of
Chrysler for Daimler stock would have likely been unattractive to Chrysler
shareholders, and it is likely that the acquisition would have been infeasible
as a cash transaction.
Yet the Chrysler transaction (or some alternative) may have been criti-
cal to Daimler if it believed that it needed to increase its scale in order to
compete globally in the future. Interestingly, Daimler has already an-
nounced plans to enter into some form of affiliation with Japan's Nissan
Diesel Motor Company, the fourth largest truck maker in Japan, which de-
velopment does indeed suggest that it plans to increase its scale of opera-
tions significantly. Even more revealing has been the behavior of other
large German firms. Although other German firms initially disapproved of
Daimler's decision to list on the NYSE, a growing number have followed
its lead.129
In a world of global competition, the fear of small and mid-sized firms
(or at least their managements) is that they must "eat or be eaten"---that is,
grow in size into one of the largest firms in their industry or expect to be-
come acquisition targets. By 1999, industry observers have seen this moti-
vation underlying British Petroleum's $48 billion merger with Amoco,
Ford's acquisition of Volvo, and Mobil's proposed merger with Exxon. At
the level of small firms, the problem is even more pressing. Students of
Italian corporate governance have predicted that its characteristic firm-
small and family-held with virtually no outside investors-is uniquely
threatened by increased competition within the European Union because the
small Italian firm has survived largely based on its established satellite re-
lationship with a larger and inefficient state-controlled firm. 130 With active
cross-border competition, this equilibrium is unlikely to continue, and the
smaller family firm is no longer viable. Thus, whether for managerialist
motives or to pursue true economics of scale and scope, European firms in-
creasingly perceive themselves under a need to grow in order to survive in a
truly global economy.
129 In August 1998, SAP, the fourth largest German company in terms of market capitalization,
listed on the New York Stock Exchange. See Corporate Germany Reaping the Rewards of Risk Taking,
FIN. TIMES, Aug., 11, 1998, at 20. Hoechst, the German chemical and pharmaceutical giant, has also
recently listed. See Survey-German Banking and Finance 1998: A Unique Perspective, FIN. TIMES,
June 24, 1998, at 7. Finally, Siemens AG, the largest German industrial corporation next to Daimler,
has indicated its intent to shift to U.S. GAAP by 2000 and list on the New York Stock Exchange by
2001. See Nicholas Bray, International Accounting Rules Catch On, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1998, at
B19D.
130 See Macey, supra note 53, at 692 (small Italian firms "unlikely to survive European unifica-
tion").
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This perceived need to grow globally is most easily satisfied through
cross-border equity mergers, of which both the Daimler-Chrysler and B.P.-
Amoco transactions represent recent examples. This can present difficult
legal challenges, particularly when the legal regimes of the two participants
have seemingly incompatible legal rules. Although U.S. lawyers and schol-
ars are used to relatively free corporate mobility between state jurisdictions,
the rules are quite different on the international level, at least for some im-
portant jurisdictions. At present, there is considerable legal uncertainty in
Germany as to whether a domestic German corporation can merge with a
foreign corporation. 13' Although a cumbersome share exchange procedure
was devised in the Daimler-Chrysler transaction that produced the func-
tional equivalent of a merger, the current reality is that triangular mergers
are disfavored by German law and any attempt to merge Dainiler into
Chrysler in a direct or triangular merger would probably not have
worked. 32 Moreover, it was even clearer that Germany's codetermination
laws required any company doing business within Germany that employs
more than certain specified numbers of employees to comply with its man-
dates. 33 Thus, if global scale is necessary, some potential acquirors may be
hobbled by their inability to escape domestic social policies, such as code-
termination, that elsewhere seem outmoded.
Important as these constraints on free corporate mobility are, another
feature of the Daimler-Chrysler union may merit even greater emphasis:
Chrysler shareholders agreed to accept shares in a German corporation in a
zero premium "merger of equals," which transaction resulted in their en-
joying far fewer protections as minority shareholders. Why should U.S.
shareholders accept fewer legal protections without a takeover premium?
The most logical answer is that U.S. shareholders and Chrysler executives
placed heavy reliance on Daimler's listing on the New York Stock Ex-
131 See Theodor Baums, Corporate Contracting around Defective Regulations: The Daimler-
Chrysler Case (Arbeitspapier No. 68, Universitat Osnabruck, 1998) (noting that some commercial reg-
isters in Germany will not register transnational mergers and others will). Or, as one of Chrysler's sen-
ior corporate attorneys observed (seemingly ruefully): "There's no such thing in German law as a
merger between a German company and a non-German company." Bar Talk: The Gamma Project: The
Marriage of Chrysler and Daimler, AM. LAW., June, 1998, at 13 (quoting Meredith Brown of Debevoise
& Plimpton).
132 See Baums, supra note 131, at 6-8. Indeed, mergers appear to be rarely used as an acquisition
method in Germany. See DIETER BEINERT, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS & MERGERS IN GERMANY 48
(1991). Instead, acquisitions are chiefly accomplished through share or asset purchases. See id. at 45.
133 Under the Co-Determination Act (Mithestimmungengesetz) of 1976, the supervisory board of a
German corporation (including both AGs and GmbHs) that employs more than two thousand employees
must consist of an equal number of shareholders' representatives and labor representatives. See
BEINERT, supra note 132, at 87-88. Other co-determination statutes apply to certain smaller companies
having more than five hundred employees. See id. Where a controlling foreign parent holds the stock of
the German company, the same basic rules apply and codetermination is required if the subsidiary em-
ploys over two thousand workers. See THE GERMAN CO-DETERMINATION ACT 23 (Hannes Schneider &
David Kingman eds., 1976).
Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance
change. To be sure, Daimler may also have enjoyed sufficient reputational
capital so that Chrysler shareholders were willing to accept their potential
legal vulnerability. Still, this possibility that reputational capital can sub-
stitute for legal protections affects only a limited number of corporations:
namely, those with "brand name" reputations (as Daimler certainly has), or,
at the least, with substantial business histories.3 Otherwise, the U.S. or
U.K. firm will be the preferred acquiror if the transaction involves an equity
component.
1 35
The implication, then, is that if a wave of global mergers occurs, the
acquirors will tend to be either firms with high stock values-because their
legal regimes protect minority rights-or firms with high reputational capi-
tal. Either way, the family-held firm is likely to be left in the wake, be-
coming either a target or a bystander.
I[I. SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE
To this point, this Article has examined in succession the barriers to
convergence in corporate governance and then the forces impelling conver-
gence-and found both powerful. This Part will turn to the a6tual interac-
tion of these contending forces and make several predictions.
A. Functional Convergence Should Dominate Formal Convergence
An implicit but overly facile assumption of the political theorists who
believe that convergence will be blocked by legislative inertia and special
interests is that convergence can only arrive through legislative amendment
of corporate codes. Yet formal structural changes may not be necessary if
functional changes, implemented by other means, can bring the relative ef-
ficiency of competing governance systems into relative parity. Essentially,
Professor Gilson has made this point, arguing that we should anticipate
functional convergence in corporate governance systems, but not necessar-
ily major legislative or structural changes in formal rules or institutions.
1 36
Gilson's analysis relies heavily upon the research of Steven Kaplan and
others, who have found that, across very different governance regimes and
institutional settings, senior managements appear to be replaced and/or dis-
ciplined at about the same rate in response to poor economic performance
134 For the finding that Italian corporations needed a substantial business history (on average 33
years) before they could effect a successful IPO, see Pagano et al., supra note 57.
135 Ford's acquisition of Volvo's automobile assets is another case in point. Volvo's shareholders
were adamant that they preferred Ford to Fiat or Renault, the two other most likely merger candidates.
See Edmund Andrews, 'Ford-Volvo: A Deal For All Sweden, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1999, at C5. Ren-
ault shares were particularly resisted by Swedish shareholders, because it was viewed as a state-
controlled company, which was unlikely to maximize the share value of Volvo or provide Swedish
stockholders with a liquid investment vehicle. See id. at C5.
136 See Gilson, supra note 27.
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by their firms. 7 Such evidence suggests that very different structural sys-
tems of governance have reached relatively similar levels of efficiency.
Still, a difficulty remains in using this data to conclude that functional
convergence is approaching: namely, this evidence is equally consistent
with future stasis as with future change. If managers in Germany, Japan,
and the United States will get the proverbial ax for about the same level of
substandard performance, and thus all face roughly the same margin for er-
ror, the logical inference to be drawn from this finding is that a measure of
functional convergence has already arrived. Further convergence cannot
necessarily be inferred, as the systems may be at a competitive equilibrium.
Rather, change would become predictable on this basis only if one of these
competing governance systems further tightened its own standards and
thereby destabilized the current equilibrium.
Put differently, given the institutional barriers to convergence, func-
tional convergence is predictable only to the extent that one governance
system begins to outperform another. Then, and only then, does a competi-
tive response become necessary. Assume, for example, that the legal gov-
ernance rules in each competing system are, hypothetically, twenty percent
inefficient in the aggregate. As a result, each system can tolerate its own
national idiosyncrasy (for example, codetermination in Germany) and need
not respond to the fact that, in a given area, the rules of a competing system
are more efficient.
Still, such a tacit collusion in inefficiency can continue only so long as
the equilibrium is not disturbed by destabilizing changes. The Asian and
Russian financial crises may have had a destabilizing impact on much of
the world. A need to reform corporate governance in light of these crises
has been widely perceived, and financial assistance from the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund has been conditioned on efforts to end
the former system of "crony capitalism." New functional adaptations then
seem most predictable within those systems that have been most disrupted
by the recent financial crisis.
B. The Motor Forces for Functional Convergence
Even if the overall efficiency of national governance systems were
more or less comparable, individual firms might still find it necessary to re-
vise their own governance structure as the result of competitive pressures.
One such pressure is the perception, shared by many large firms operating
in international markets, that they must grow in scale to survive as viable
independent firms. In common, the otherwise dissimilar mergers between
137 See Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan
and the U.S., 102 J. POL. ECON. 510 (1994); Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executive Turnover and Firm Per-
formance in Germany, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 142 (1994); Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton,
Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards: Determinants and Implications for Managers, 36 J. FIN.
ECON. 224 (1994).
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Daimler and Chrysler, Deutsche Bank and Bankers Trust, British Petroleum
and Amoco, Ford and Volvo, and Exxon and Mobil exemplify this pattern.
To the extent that acquiring firms are incorporated in jurisdictions that pro-
tect minority shareholders, that is, the United States or the United Kingdom,
the acquiring firm has the option of using its own shares as the considera-
tion for such a merger. Two consequences follow from this option: (1) such
firms may be able to economize on the costs of achieving the desired global
scale, 38 and (2) in a cross-border merger, the firm incorporated in the mi-
nority-protecting legal regime is more likely to be the surviving entity.'39
At first glance, the Daimler-Chrysler transaction seemingly stands as
an obvious counterexanple: in that case, Daimler, the firm with fewer pro-
tections for its minority shareholders, emerged as the surviving company
and used its shares as the medium of exchange. But to effect this acquisi-
tion, Daimler found it necessary to revise its governance structure in ad-
vance of the merger, beginning with its 1993 decision to list on the New
York Stock Exchange. Such a listing, which entails new governance and
disclosure standards, is a paradigmatic example of functional convergence.
Ultimately, the important lesson of the Daimler-Chrysler merger is that
Chrysler executives were willing to exchange their shares and options for a
German company's shares-at least when the latter's shares were listed on
the New York Stock Exchange. This willingness may have been signifi-
cantly predicated upon the assurance of full disclosure that an NYSE listing
conveys. In addition, because the Daimler-Chrysler merger significantly
diluted the position of Deutsche Bank,140 the long-time controlling share-
holder of Daimler, Chrysler shareholders had less reason to fear the misuse
of the broad powers given a controlling shareholder under German law.
141
Under this scenario, the prediction is not that Anglo-American firms
will acquire European firms until the latter become scarce. Family-
controlled firms may well resist any overtures, because, as earlier ex-
plained, the value of their controlling shares can exceed the per-share price
that the acquiring firm will pay for the firm as a whole.142 But to the extent
138 Of the recent cross-border mergers, only Deutsche Bank's bid for Bankers Trust has been for
cash, and revealingly Deutsche Bank is not listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Also, its acquisi-
tion of Bankers Trust is for approximately $9 billion and thus within its financial limits. Larger take-
overs in the range of the Amoco-B.P., Exxon-Mobil or Daimler-Chrysler transactions would be
extremely difficult to finance for cash.
139 This is because it can issue listed shares that will be the functional equivalent of cash.
140 It is estimated that former Chrysler shareholders will receive 44% of the stock in the merged en-
tity. See John Tagliabue, Germans Reject Challenge to Daimler Stock Options, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
1998, at D4. In addition, American institutional investors may have already held significant stakes in
Daimler, thus raising at least the possibility that American shareholders may own a majority of the
merged entity.
141 It is also possible that this feature was a major attraction of the merger to Dainler management
because it freed them from the supervision of their controlling shareholder.
142 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text
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that a need for global scale is perceived to exist, large but threatened firms
in major international industries will seek merger partners. The recent spate
of cross-border mergers evidences this and suggests that more such trans-
actions are likely. In this mating dance, those firms able to issue higher-
valued shares with minority protections have a significant advantage.
The desire to effect an equity merger is by no means the only reason to
seek a U.S. listing. The firm's management may have a variety of other
motives. First, by expanding the firm's shareholder base, it may enable
management to dilute a controlling shareholder whose iron hand the is-
suer's managers want to see relaxed. 43 Second, a U.S. listing will pre-
dictably increase the company's stock price and thereby placate
shareholders. 144 Third, a U.S. listing may enable the firm's managers to in-
stitute U.S.-style stock option plans, which U.S. institutional investors can
be expected to accept but at which European investors may frown. From a
managerialist perspective, the difference in pay scales (particularly as a re-
sult of stock options) is striking between U.S. and European firms. One
statistic from the Daimler-Chrysler merger is truly startling: the entire ten
members of the Daimler managing board received in the aggregate less
compensation-around $12.3 million-in the year before the merger than
did Chrysler's second-ranking officer, who received slightly more than $13
million. 45 Chrysler's chief executive officer ("CEO") alone stands to re-
ceive more than $69 million in stock and cash in the merger in respect of
outstanding Chrysler stock options and bonuses that he had previously been
issued.146 Given that German CEOs typically receive much less, 147 this dis-
parity creates an incentive to internationalize one's shareholder base, both
by listing on U.S. stock exchanges and by effecting cross-border acquisi-
tions that will bring in U.S. shareholders. Already there are signs that the
prior hostility of German law to U.S.-style executive compensation is being
relaxed.
148
143 While Deutsche Bank's supervision of Daimler hardly amounted to an "iron hand" rule, the
Daimler-Chrysler merger did dilute its stake to 15%, which seems below the level sufficient to confer
control.
144 See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
145 See Tagliabue, supra note 140.
146 See id.
147 Daimler's own CEO was estimated to have been paid between $1.1 and $1.5 million during this
same year. See id.
148 See David Johnston, American-Style Pay Moves Abroad; Importance of Stock Options Expands
in a Global Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1998, at Cl. It can be debated whether the new German
system for stock options through the conversion of debentures that are sold only to management repre-
sents an example of "functional convergence" or "formal convergence," but either way German courts
have upheld the practice.
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C. The Regulatory Costs of a US. Listing: A Survey
Whatever the motives for seeking a U.S. listing, the foreign issuer must
balance the projected benefits from listing in the U.S. against a very real in-
crease both in regulatory costs and the potential for litigation. Once an is-
suer lists either on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ, the U.S. securities laws
become broadly applicable to it.149 This is critically important, because the
U.S. securities laws do not simply require heightened disclosure and more
rigorous financial reporting; rather, they also seek to reduce agency costs in
ways that particularly inhibit controlling shareholders and that are not
closely paralleled by European law.
Historically, the federal securities laws were originally focused on
compelling disclosures by promoters and other controlling persons.150 That
is, the primary goal of both the British Parliament and the U.S. Congress
was less to mandate disclosure of all material information relating to firm
value than to focus on the special (and well-recognized) abuses by which
promoters overreached shareholders, in particular by using the proceeds of
the stock flotation to buy property from the promoters at inflated prices.' 5 '
Although the goals of the federal securities laws have broadened, this focus
on reducing agency costs has persisted. According to one scholar, "the
most substantial innovation" of the United States' mandatory disclosure
system "was the use of disclosure after the promotional stage to combat
manager/shareholder agency problems."'152 In short, both as they were
originally adopted and as they have evolved, the federal securities laws
have focused on monitoring the relationship between controlling sharehold-
ers or managers and their firm.
The following provisions of the federal securities laws are likely to
surprise the foreign issuer, because they go well beyond requiring material
149 Essentially, foreign issuers that have more than 300 shareholders of record in the United States
are in theory required to register under § 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. However, an
exemptive rule affords them an easy escape from the U.S. periodic disclosure system so long as they
agree to provide the SEC with the same documents and information that they file in their home countries
or give their shareholders. See Rule 12g3-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2 (1998). This exemption is
ended, however, once the foreign issuer lists on NASDAQ. See Rule 12g3-2(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2
(1998). Listing on an exchange requires the foreign issuer to register under §12(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, and Rule 12g3-2 thereby becomes inapplicable. See also infra notes 178-79 and
accompanying text.
ISO A historical consensus exists that the Securities Act of 1933 was largely modeled after a British
statute. Professor Mahoney has argued that the original intent of both the British Parliament and the
American Congress was to force promoters to disclose self-dealing relationships with the firm. See Ma-
honey, supra note 36, at 1048-1100. Professor Mahoney argues that the federal mandatory disclosure
system was "an incremental change from a longstanding set of judicial doctrines that were designed to
combat a specific agency problem-the promoter problem." Id. at 1111. Related agency problems arise
whenever there is a controlling shareholder, as there typically is in legal regimes characterized by con-
centrated ownership.
"' See id. at 1049, 1111.
"s2 Id. at I1111.
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disclosures by the issuer and seek in effect to impose substantive obliga-
tions on managers and controlling persons, essentially in order to minimize
agency costs. Because prior commentary has largely ignored this focus of
the federal securities law, an extended examination is necessary.
1. Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act.-This critical provision requires
any person or group owning beneficially more than five percent of any class
of equity security registered pursuant to section 12 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") to file a report (known as a
Schedule 13D) within ten days after the five percent threshold is crossed.1
5 3
The differences between this provision and the European Community's
Transparency Directive are notable: (1) the trigger level is five percent, not
ten percent; 54 (2) the broad definition of beneficial ownership in section
13(d) deems a person to be an owner if the person has or shares the power
to vote or to buy or sell the security, directly or indirectly, through any
contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship or otherwise; 155 (3) sec-
tion 13(d) also requires disclosure of the identity of persons who agree to
act in concert with respect to more than five percent of any class of voting
equity security "for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting, or disposing
of equity securities ' 5 -thereby sweeping many informal coalitions within
section 13(d)'s coverage; (4) the Schedule 13D filing must be amended
promptly following any material increase or reduction in the filing person's
holdings or in the composition of the group; 157 (5) Schedule 13D requires
much fuller disclosure than does the Transparency Directive, covering not
only the identity of the acquiring person or group, but also the source and
amount of funds used to acquire the securities, the purpose of the acquisi-
tion, and the nature of any arrangements to which the acquiror is a party
153 The statutory command to make a disclosure filing in § 13(d) is fleshed out by Rule 13d-l (a).
Rule 13d-l(b)(1) then permits institutional investors under certain conditions to file a shorter, less bur-
densome document, known as a Schedule 13G, within 45 days after the conclusion of the calendar year.
Sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Exchange Act do not apply to equity securities of issuers that must file
periodic reports only by reason of§ 15(d) of the Exchange Act because the issuer made a public offering
in the United States. This exemption, however, will not benefit issuers traded in any public market
(other than a very small bulletin board market), as § 12(g) will require registration if there are as few as
three hundred shareholders resident in the United States.
15 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text for the 10% threshold under the Transparency Di-
rective.
5 See SEC Rule 13d-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (1998).
156 See SEC Rule 13d-5(b)(i), 17 C.F.R § 240.13d-5 (1998); see also Wellman v. Dickinson, 682
F.2d 355, 362-63 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983). No formal or written agreement is
necessary to give rise to a § 13(d) group. See SEC v. Savoy Industries Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1162-63
(D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979); GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 715-16 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
157 See Rule 13d-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2 (1998). For a discussion of this "promptness" require-
ment, see SEC Litigation Release No. 12835 (April 11, 1991), SEC v. Edelman, 48 SEC Docket No.12,
at 952, 953 (April 23, 1991).
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relating to the target company's securities.158 These disclosures can, and
often do, become the subject of litigation in the U.S. courts as either the tar-
get company, the SEC, or others seek to use section 13(d) as a window by
which to peer into the acquiring group and learn its plans. In turn, this
means that the process of preparing a Schedule 13D is complicated and
costly and will almost certainly involve the retention of U.S. counsel.
Most importantly, the beneficial ownership reporting requirements of
section 13(d) apply to both U.S. and foreign persons who hold the requisite
amount of voting securities in a firm that is registered under section 12 of
the Exchange Act.15 9 Thus, if a French citizen buys more than five percent
of the voting stock in an Italian corporation that is listed on NASDAQ, the
reporting requirements of section 13 are triggered, even if the stock is pur-
chased on an Italian exchange and no jurisdictional means within the United
States are employed. This same conclusion also holds if the Italian com-
pany only listed American Depositary Receipts (or "ADRs") on the U.S.
exchange, as the SEC looks through the ADRs and requires the underlying
security to be registered under section 12.160
Suppose then that the Italian corporation lists on NASDAQ in 1999
and registers under section 12(g) of the Exchange Act. Must all its existing
five-percent-or-greater blockholders file a Schedule 13D within ten days?
Here the SEC has made a small concession and permits the filing to be
made on a delayed basis. Because these securities were acquired prior to
the section 12(g) registration, the SEC deems the requisite filing to be under
section 13(g) of the Exchange Act, which must be made within forty-five
days after the close of the calendar year covered by the registration state-
ment.161 Still, this new obligation could be an abrupt surprise for many
large blockholders.
The fact that U.S. law imposes this obligation does not mean that it can
necessarily enforce it. A high rate of noncompliance is probable, particu-
larly with regard to informal groups. But because of the Transparency Di-
rective, persons owning ten percent of a European-listed company should
already be disclosing their identity and thus could become conspicuous tar-
gets if the SEC or others wished to cross-check. Having thus found at least
158 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C..§ 78m(d)(1) (1994); see also Sched-
ule 13D, Items 2-6,17 C.F.1L § 240.13d-101 (1998).
159 For a good overview of the application of the Exchange Act to foreign persons and entities, see
Edward F. Greene et al., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND DERIvATIVEs
MARKETS § 7.02 (4th ed. 1998).
160 See American Depository Receipts Securities Act Release No. 6894, 56 Fed. Reg. 24,420 (1991)
(the "ADR Concept Release"); see also Greene et al., supra note 159, § 7.02, at 7-4.
16! See SEC Filing of Schedules 13D and 13G, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(b)(2) (1998). Although tech-
nically the Schedule 13G is only available to U.S. institutional investors (and only under certain condi-
tions), a series of no-action letters have permitted foreign institutional investors to use this simplified
form. See Greene et al., supra note 159, § 7.02, at 7-5 n.8.
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some persons required to file under section 13(d), the SEC could demand
far more disclosure under its rules.
2. Tender Offers.-Under section 14(d) of the Exchange Act, if any
person, including a European corporation, makes a tender or exchange offer
for more than five percent of any class of equity securities of a target corpo-
ration, including another European corporation, that is registered under sec-
tion 12 of the Exchange Act, that offer must comply with the disclosure and
procedural requirements of section 14(d). Even if the target is not so regis-
tered, the antifraud rules of section 14(e) of the Exchange Act will still ap-
ply if the offer is made to U.S. residents. Thus, U.S. tender offer disclosure
rules could apply to a tender offer by a foreign bidder for a foreign target
corporation that had one percent or less of its stock held by U.S. resi-
dents.
162
Not only does U.S. law thus potentially apply, but its substantive pro-
visions, particularly regarding timing, withdrawal, and proration rights, are
significantly different from those of many other countries. For example,
U.S. law gives each shareholder of the same class the opportunity to par-
ticipate in the offer on a proportional basis and to receive the "best price"
paid to any other shareholder pursuant to the tender offer.163 Moreover, al-
though the term "tender offer" is not defined by the Williams Act, the SEC
has long taken the position that negotiated purchases can under certain cir-
cumstances amount to de facto tender offers, 164 which conclusion will al-
most invariably mean that U.S. law has been violated.
Because of the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. securities laws, the
potential exists that U.S. law could directly conflict with the tender offer
rules of another country, most likely those of the jurisdiction of the target
company's incorporation. The SEC has recognized the need to minimize
such regulatory conflicts and has granted a number of exemptions on a
162 In a 1990 Concept Release, the SEC proposed exempting foreign bidders from the procedural
and disclosure provisions of the Williams Act where (1) the target was a foreign corporation, and (2)
10% or less of the target's outstanding shares were held of record by U.S. shareholders (other than U.S.
citizens who were 10% or greater shareholders). See Concept Release on Multinational Tender and Ex-
change Offers, Securities Act Release No. 33-6866, 55 Fed. Reg. 23, 75 (1990). The SEC also indicated
that the civil liability provisions in § 14(e) of the Exchange Act would continue to apply. The SEC has
recently moved to implement this proposal. See Cross-Border Tender Offers Business Combinations
and Rights Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7611, 63 Fed. Reg. 69,136 (1998). Even if it were
adopted, the proposed 10% threshold would leave most large multinational firms listed on the NYSE
fully subject to U.S. tender offer law, because U.S. ownership would exceed 10%.
163 See SEC Equal Treatment of Security Holders, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1998).
164 The SEC has long used an eight-factor test to determine whether closely-linked purchases
amount to a tender offer. See SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 949-52 (9th Cir.
1985); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Under this test, efforts by a
controlling shareholder to buy shares from insiders at a common price could give rise to a tender offer
with a concomitant obligation under Rule 14d-10 to open the offer to all shareholders.
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case-by-case basis to accommodate concurrent foreign and domestic bids
for foreign target corporations.
1 65
Bidders have also sought to avoid the application of U.S. tender offer
law by making tender offer bids open only to persons resident outside the
United States. 66  It remains an open and unresolved question, however,
whether the SEC or private parties could successfully challenge a tender of-
fer for a company registered under section 12 that excluded U.S. resi-
dents.167 In any event, many bidders will not want to leave a significant
percentage of minority shareholders outstanding in the United States after
their offer and so are compelled to negotiate with the SEC over the terms of
a partial exemption from U.S. tender offer rules. -
3. Corporate Governance.-Although listing on a U.S. exchange or
NASDAQ does not subject an issuer to U.S. corporate law, it is necessary
for any issuer (foreign or domestic) to enter into a listing agreement with
the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange ("AMEX"),
or NASDAQ in order to have its securities traded on such market. These
listing agreements all contain corporate governance provisions, although
those required by NASDAQ and AMEX are somewhat less demanding. 
68
For example, the standard NYSE requirements specify that a listed com-
pany must (a) have at least two outside directors on its board, (b) establish
and maintain an audit committee composed of independent directors, and
(c) set an appropriate quorum requirement for shareholder meetings. 169
Other NYSE corporate governance policies, including its voting rights pol-
icy, which precludes certain deviations from a "one-share, one-vote" stan-
dard,170 do not apply to foreign issuers or are subject to waiver if counsel
opines to the NYSE that local law precludes such a policy.1 71  Still, the
NYSE does insist on some minimum governance standards for all issuers,
including (i) an audit committee or similar body to monitor transactions
165 For a review of SEC policy toward concurrent foreign and domestic tender offers, see Greene et
al., supra note 159, § 7.03(3); see also SEC Release No. 34-27671 (Feb. 2, 1990).
16 SeeGreeneetal.,supranote 159, § 7.03[4].
167 Some informed commentators have opined that the SEC would today likely take the view that
the bidder cannot avoid compliance with the Williams Act by excluding U.S. residents from the offer, at
least in the case of an issuer whose equity securities were registered under § 12 of the Exchange Act.
See id. § 7.0314][b], at 7-25.
168 For an overview of these requirements, see id. § 2.03[2][b].
169 See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 303.00,310.00(A).
170 The NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ have a common voting rights policy that precludes actions
that disenfranchise shareholders of stock traded in their markets or dilutes their voting strength. This
policy specifically prohibits any disparate reduction of voting rights through any corporate action or is-
suance of stock, including plans that cap voting rights for any shareholder or that require a holding pe-
riod before voting rights become fully exercisable. See Order Granting Approval to Rule Changes
Relating to Exchanges' and Associations' Rules Regarding Shareholder Voting Rights, SEC Release
'No. 34-35121, 59 Fed. Reg. 66,570 (1994).
171 See Greene et al., supra note 159, § 2.03[2][b], at 2-21 to 2-23.
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between the company and its insiders, (ii) an annual shareholders' meeting,
and (iii) a requirement that any tender offer made by the company for its
own shares or for those of another listed company give all holders of the
target an equal opportunity to participate." 2  Both the AMEX and
NASDAQ follow substantially similar policies. 173
4. The SEC's "Going Private" Rules.-Under section 13(e) of the
Exchange Act, the SEC is granted authority to regulate purchases by an is-
suer registered under section 12 of its own shares to the extent that such
rules are "reasonably designed" to prevent "fraudulent, deceptive or ma-
nipulative" acts. This authority also extends to purchases by a controlling
person or affiliate of the issuer. Pursuant to this authority, the SEC has
adopted Rule 13e-3 to regulate "going private" transactions, and its reach
goes well beyond that of other SEC antifraud rules.174 Under Rule 13e-3,
the triggering test is whether the proposed transaction would result in the is-
suer losing its listing on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ or no longer being
held of record by more than three hundred persons. In short, if the control-
ling shareholder threatens its public shareholders with a loss of liquidity,
Rule 13e-3 applies and requires elaborate disclosures pursuant to which the
SEC gains the ability as a practical matter to assess the fairness of the trans-
action. 75
Although Rule 13e-3 could certainly slow a European blockholder that
was intent on squeezing out minority shareholders at an unfairly low price,
the ultimate impact of Rule 13e-3 may seem open to doubt because it is
simply a disclosure rule, and the federal securities laws do not provide any
remedy for a fully disclosed breach of fiduciary duty. 176 Experience has
172 See id. § 2.03[2][b], at 2-23 to 2-24 (discussing nonwaivable provisions of NYSE corporate gov-
ernance policies).
173 See id. § 2.03 [2][c], [d].
174 Rule 13e-3 requires a detailed evaluation of the fairness of the proposed transaction, including a
detailed assessment of the material factors upon which the issuer's claim that the transaction is fair is
based. See Schedule 13E-3, Item 8(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1998). Failing this mandatory disclo-
sure, the transaction can be enjoined or damages sought. There is thus no need to prove a material omis-
sion if the specific justifications and evaluation strikes the court as inadequate. See Howing Co. v.
Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470, 1478-79 (6th Cir. 1987).
175 Among other things, the issuer is required to focus on fairness by describing the purpose of the
transaction, the alternatives considered, and the effect of the transaction, including the benefits and det-
riments to the issuer and affected securities holders. See Schedule 13E-3, Item 7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-
100 (1998). If an outside report or valuation is utilized, there must be a sunimary of the report and in-
formation about how the outside party was selected and how the compensation of such party was to be
determined. See Schedule 13E-3, Item 9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1998). Most importantly, Item 8 of
Schedule 13E-3 requires the issuer (or the affiliate filing the Schedule 13E-3) to state that it "reasonably
believes that the Rule 13e-3 transaction is fair or unfair to the unaffiliated security holders" and then re-
quires the issuer or affiliate to "discuss in reasonable detail the material factors upon which the belief...
is based." Schedule 13e-3, Item 8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1998).
176 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1997).
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shown, however, that relatively few fiduciary breaches are ever fully dis-
closed, at least in the SEC's eyes. Thus, the rigorous disclosure standards
in Rule 13e-3 function in practical effect as an effective substitute for rules
requiring substantive fairness. In addition, a private cause of action has
been recognized under Rule 13e-3, with the result that a class action can be
maintained for its violation.177
Because foreign issuers are generally subject to Rule 13e-3 (if the for-
eign issuer is listed on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ178 or if it has issued
securities for a U.S. reporting company179), listing on a U.S. exchange car-
ries with it the obligation to justify in great detail the fairness of any
squeeze-out transaction. The net impact might be to substantially neutralize
the traditional and formidable powers of a controlling shareholder under
German law-if the foreign issuer has listed its stock on a U.S. exchange or
NASDAQ or entered into a merger with a U.S. company.
5. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.-All issuers-foreign or domes-
tic-who become subject to section 12 of the Exchange Act acquire a legal
obligation to "make and keep books, and records, and accounts, which, in
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and disposi-
tions of the assets of the issuer,"18 and to "devise and maintain a system of
internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances
that" certain specified standards will be satisfied.181 Both these statutory
obligations share a common purpose: to preclude the use of corporate funds
to make bribes or other "questionable payments" and to discourage the
creation of "off-books" accounts that can be used for such purposes. SEC
rules also prohibit any corporate officer or other person from directly or in-
directly falsifying or causing to be falsified "any book, record or account"
subject to these rules'1 2 Hence, at least as a formal legal obligation, listing
in the United States disables a foreign corporation from engaging in bribery
or similar practices to obtain contracts or regulatory approvals or otherwise
market its services.
Although an international consensus has been reached, at least among
the major industrial nations, that bribery to obtain business contracts either
domestically or abroad should be unlawful,183 U.S. securities and criminal
law today enforces this norm alone.
177 See, e.g., Howing, 826 F.2d at 1474 (upholding private cause of action under Rule 13e-3), aff'd,
927 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1991).
178 See SEC Rule 12g3-2(d)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(d)(3) (1998).
179 See SEC Rule 12g3-2(d)(2), 17 C.F.RL § 240.12g3-2(d)(2) (1998).
180 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(b)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (1994).
181 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(b)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (1994).
182 See SEC Rule 13b2-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1 (1998).
183 In 1998, Congress approved an international convention sponsored by the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that committed each OECD nation to criminalize such
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6. The Extraterritorial Reach of Rule lOb-5.-Under the dual "con-
duct" and "effect" tests used by the U.S. courts to determine the extraterri-
torial reach of Rule lOb-5, a U.S. court has subject matter jurisdiction if
either (a) the foreign defendant's activities in the United States went beyond
a "merely preparatory" level and involved actions or culpable failures to act
that "directly caused" the claimed losses, 84 or (b) a predominantly foreign
transaction has "substantial effects" in the United States.18 In its most im-
portant recent decision on the subject, the Second Circuit has upheld subject
matter jurisdiction based on Rule 1Ob-5 in a case involving at bottom only a
substantial purchase of stock in a U.K. company by a Channel Islands sub-
sidiary of a Bermuda holding company. 8 6 The decisive factor for the Sec-
ond Circuit appears to have been that ten percent of the U.K. target
company's stock was traded on NASDAQ in the form of ADRs. Given this
broad reach, a foreign issuer listed on a U.S. exchange must realistically as-
sume that it can be sued in the United States for any allegedly false state-
ments made anywhere in the world if the statements would foreseeably
impact a U.S. securities market. Although some commentators have
viewed the broad extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities law as "danger-
ous,"'187 and various compromises have been proposed to curb its reach,' 8
the current reality is that a U.S. listing entails a substantial litigation risk.
As incomplete as this selective tour of the impact of the federal securi-
ties laws on foreign issuers has been, it suffices to support the following
generalization: the U.S. securities laws have a special constraining impact
on controlling persons. Much of the discretion and potential for opportun-
istic actions that controlling shareholders can take under other legal regimes
is sharply limited by these laws. Specifically, U.S. law regulates control-
ling shareholders at the following critical junctures:
(1) its ownership disclosure rules deny them the veil of anonymity
by requiring a transparent ownership structure pursuant to section
13(d) of the Exchange Act;
bribery. See Congress Passes Bill to Curb International Business Bribery, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 22, 1998,
at AS.
194 See Leasco Data Processing Equip. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1335-37 (2d Cir. 1972).
185 See Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252,263-63 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied 492 U.S. 939 (1989); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 988-90 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
186 See Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group Plc, 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1044 (1996).
187 See generally Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of
American Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 207 (1996).
188 See Donald C. Langevoort, Schoenbaum Revisited: Limiting the Scope ofAntifraud Protection in
an Internationalized Securities Marketplace, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241,255-60 (1992).
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(2) its insider trading rules restrict (with criminal penalties) their
ability to purchase or sell based on material, nonpublic informa-
tion;
(3) its tender offer rules assure all shareholders an equal opportu-
nity to participate in any tender offer for their shares;
(4) its continuous disclosure system generally requires timely dis-
closure of material developments by the issuer or controlling
shareholders; and
(5) its "going private" rules deny controlling shareholders the
practical ability to squeeze out the minority at an unfairly low
price.
The more pervasive and inhibiting these restrictions on controlling share-
holders appear to be, the more the apparent mystery deepens as to why for-
eign issuers seem to be migrating in record numbers to U.S. exchanges.
190
Correspondingly, this pattern also raises a normative policy question that is
next addressed: Should U.S. law attempt to impose quasi-substantive re-
strictions on the foreign issuer who wishes to enter the United States mar-
kets?
D. The Case for Mandatory Rules
Three different arguments will be advanced in this section, but they
have a common theme: dispersed ownership requires special legal rules if it
is to persist. Firms listed in the same market have a greater interdepen-
dency than is generally appreciated, because of what this Article will call
"network externalities." As a result, it becomes appropriate for U.S. law
not simply to protect U.S. investors, but also to protect its capital markets.
1. Listing as a Bonding Mechanism.-The simplest explanation for the
migration of foreign issuers to U.S. exchanges and NASDAQ is that such a
listing is a form of bonding-a credible and binding commitment by the is-
suer not to exploit whatever discretion it enjoys under foreign law to over-
reach the minority investor.191 That is, the issuer ties its own hands by
subjecting itself to the mandatory requirements of U.S. law in order to in-
duce minority shareholders to invest in it.
189 See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. 2199,2206-07 (1997).
190 As noted earlier, foreign listings on the New York Stock Exchange have recently tripled, over
one thousand foreign issuers now trade in U.S. markets, and the trend seems to be increasing. See supra
notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
191 "Bonding" is, of course, a term of art in the standard "agency cost" literature. Essentially, the
principal can either '"monitor" the agent to reduce inappropriate conduct by the agent, or the agent can
"bond" its own conduct, for example, by posting a surety bond or otherwise subjecting itself to penal-
ties. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,308 (1976).
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The problem with this explanation, however, is that the issuer may
simply have decided to list for other reasons: to expand its shareholder base,
to gain the advantages of increased liquidity, or to overcome market seg-
mentation.192 How then can one distinguish true efforts at bonding from
simply an attempt to gain a broader shareholder base? The answer probably
lies in the motivation for the listing transaction. If the issuer has already
listed elsewhere, enjoys a liquid market, and does not use its U.S. listing to
make a primary offering into the United States, then its entry into the U.S.
markets does not look like a pursuit of greater liquidity, but may be an ef-
fort to increase its stock price through bonding. Even more clearly, when
the U.S. listing is incident to an IPO, which has often been the case with Is-
raeli high-tech companies, or where the issuer is contemplating a prospec-
tive equity merger, then there is even more reason to view bonding as the
appropriate description. As noted earlier, European firms on average have
been unable to effect an IPO until they were decades older and much larger
than the typical American firm doing an IPO. 193 By entering the U.S. mar-
kets, a foreign issuer may thus be able to make an equity offering that could
not be made in its home market. But the reason that it cannot sell equity in
its home market may be the fear that its controlling shareholders will ex-
propriate much of the minority's investment. Migration to the United
States and its greater legal protections thus may constitute a bonding strat-
egy to solve this problem.
In general, the higher the regulatory costs of entry into the U.S. securi-
ties markets are perceived to be, the more this hypothesis becomes the most
satisfactory explanation for a U.S. listing, because if increased liquidity
were instead the primary goal, it could be obtained in other international se-
curities markets, such as London.
2. Network Externalities as a Justification for Mandatory Rules.-If
bonding explains part, but not all, of the phenomenon of foreign firms mi-
grating to U.S. securities markets, it still does not necessarily justify sub-
jecting the foreign issuer to U.S. law. Arguably, this bonding hypothesis
points toward a different policy: namely, permitting, but not requiring, for-
eign issuers to subject themselves to U.S. securities law. Then, those firms
that wished to assure minority investors that they would comply with the
higher U.S. standards could voluntarily elect to opt into the U.S. system,
while other firms could list while agreeing only to meet their home juris-
192 While market segmentation; that is, the existence of barriers to cross-border capital flows, sup-
plies an alternative explanation for multiple and global stock listings, financial economists have recently
preferred the bonding explanation. See Oren Furst, A Theoretical Analysis of The Investor Protection
Regulations Argument for Global Listing of Stocks (Sept. 10, 1998) (working paper, International Center
for Finance at Yale University, on file with the author); see also Blass et al., supra note 114, at 86-87
(noting that high quality Israeli IPOs have preferred to list in the United States on NASDAQ, whereas
lower quality IPOs have listed on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange).
193 See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
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diction's standards. 94 Given such a choice, the two populations arguably
would segregate, and potentially the shares of firms agreeing only to meet
their home country standards would trade at a price discount. On this basis,
some commentators have urged the abandonment of mandatory U.S. disclo-
sure rules and the adoption of essentially such a system.
195
The common premise of these proposals is that the "United States has
only a weak interest in the disclosure behavior of foreign issuers, even those
whose shares are predominantly owned by U.S. investors.' 196 Among these
critics, some doubt the benefit of any mandatory disclosure standards, while
others believe the use of U.S. standards for U.S. issuers benefits allocative
efficiency within the U.S. economy, but they still oppose their broader ap-
plication to foreign issuers (even if principally owned by U.S. investors).'
What then is the U.S. interest in requiring foreign issuers to comply
with U.S. disclosure standards once they enter the U.S. market, even though
only a minority of the affected shareholders are U.S. citizens? Perhaps the
strongest argument for mandatory standards is that the United States should
protect the "network externalities" associated with its securities markets.
Network externalities are a familiar economic concept and are defined as
the increasing returns to users of a product as its total number of users
grow. 8 The classic example is the telephone: if the telephone is used only
by one thousand citizens, it is a novelty; if it is used by 100 million, it is a
necessity. As the number of users grows and each user can reach more per-
sons by means of the telephone, the telephone has a higher value for all us-
ers. Similarly, as more people came to use the automobile earlier in this
century, a supporting infrastructure developed around it: gas stations be-
came plentiful and roads were upgraded, making the automobile a more
valuable means of transportation.
That there are network externalities associated with securities markets
seems self-evident. As more users come to a market, the market gains li-
quidity and, predictably, price spreads narrow, as dealers can quote nar-
rower bid-asked spreads as trading volume increases. 199 Clearly, a listing
194 The election to comply with "higher" U.S. standards would, however, have to be irrevocable;
otherwise, having sold shares to U.S. investors, foreign issuers might reconsider their election and return
to a "lower" disclosure standard.
195 See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guznan, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International
Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 941-45 (1998); Merritt Fox, Securities Disclo-
sure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom?, 95 MicH. L. REV. 2498 (1997).
196 See Fox, supra note 195, at 2618.
197 This is Professor Fox's position-he doubts the case for investor protection, but believes man-
datory disclosure does improve efficient pricing and allocative efficiency. See id.
198 For a recent discussion of "network externalities" as applied to corporate law, see generally Mi-
chael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757 (1995).
199 It is well recognized that a security's "spread" (i.e, the distance between its bid and asked price)
tends to narrow as trading volume increases. Greater liquidity allows the market-maker to reduce the
price it charges for functioning as a financial intermediary.
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becomes more valuable as more investors come to the market. In this light,
an initial "network externality" is the advantage of complementarity. As is-
suers conform to common disclosure, accounting, and listing standards, in-
vestors gain the ability to compare securities in a common language and
scoring system. Inherently, investors need to compare security A against
security B, and this task becomes quicker and easier as more issuers con-
verge to comply with the dominant market's accounting and disclosure
standards. In short, as any number of commentators have noted,2° ° har-
monization of disclosure standards results in reduced effort and transaction
costs for the investor.2 ° '
Complementarity is, however, only an initial example. While com-
plementarity chiefly reduces costs for investors, the more important net-
work externalities that surround a securities market may be those that
primarily enhance the issuer's ability to obtain the highest price for its secu-
rities. Obviously, the existing listed firms in a market share a common in-
terest that newcomers not injure or erode the reputational capital
surrounding the market that they may have created. For example, if a for-
eign issuer's management could engage in insider trading, which would be
possible if U.S. law were superseded by home country law, as proponents
of curbing the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. securities laws have urged,
then the existing domestic firms in the same market might be disadvan-
taged. Similarly, lax accounting standards abroad might make the incoming
foreign firm appear more successful than the domestic firm because of the
absence of a common disclosure standard; in short, domestic firms might be
injured by the uncertainty and reputational stigma that insider trading and
other predatory conduct arguably create. Nor is the injury merely reputa-
tional: if insider trading becomes possible, dealers in the market will realize
that they are trading at a disadvantage with informed traders and will pre-
dictably increase their bid-asked spreads to protect themselves from better-
informed traders.20 2 This point is not limited to insider trading; rather, in-
200 For a good review of these arguments, see Uri Geiger, The Case for the Harmonization of Secu-
rities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market, 1997 CoLUM. Bus. L. REV. 241; see also Lawrence J.
White, Competition versus Harmonization-An Overview of International Regulation of Financial Serv-
ices, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: HARMONIZATION VERSUS COMPETITION 5, 39 (Claude
Barfield ed., 1996).
201 The counterargument will predictably be made that an efficient market can discount the legal
risks associated with foreign stocks. Although this is highly debatable, it misses the key point about the
social waste involved. The available empirical evidence suggests that accounting differences do signifi-
cantly affect the decisions of participants in the capital markets. See FREDERICK D. S. CHOI AND
RICHARD M. LEVICH, THE CAPITAL MARKET EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING DIVERSITY 90-
98 (1990) (emphasizing costs and social waste involved in attempts to compare issues using different
accounting systems). In short, even if the approximate adjustments can be made to share price, the ef-
fort is costly and wasteful.
202 For a fuller discussion of the likelihood that specialists and market makers would react to the
possibility of informed trading by insiders, by widening their spreads, see Lawrence R. Glosten, Insider
Trading, Liquidity, and the Role of the Monopolist Specialist, 62 J. Bus. 211 (1989). It is, of course,
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sider trading is but one example of conduct that increases agency costs. To
the extent that agency costs are greater under foreign law regimes, U.S. in-
vestors are faced with an increased prospect of self-interested action by
management and other insiders, as foreign firms not subject to U.S. legal
standards increasingly enter the market.
Another subcategory of network externalities involves the assurances
that issuers in the U.S. market receive about the conduct of their fellow is-
suers. For example, a firm that today enters the U.S. market becomes sub-
ject to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which precludes not only bnbes
and "questionable payments," but all forms of off-books accounts and falsi-
fication of accounting records. Thus, a foreign issuer entering the U.S.
market effectively agrees not to compete against its U.S. rivals using such
means. Even if this prohibition cannot be fully enforced, there is at the
margin some reduction in the risk that U.S. issuers face that they will be
subject to illicit competition from foreign rivals. This is another example of
a network externality, because as the number of listed foreign issuers
grows, the earlier firms gain increased value from the listing of subsequent
firms.
Closely related to this benefit is the benefit to earlier-listed firms that
they not suffer competitive injury because of their mandatory disclosure of
proprietary information, which their competitors can then exploit. Some
commentators have argued that mandatory disclosure, as practiced in the
United States, frequently results in competitive injuries to U.S. firms. °3
But, if so, requiring foreign firms to comply with a similar standard at least
levels the playing field-whereas permitting foreign firms to continue to
disclose under a less-demanding standard would perpetuate this disparity.
Once again, as foreign firms list, the earlier-listed domestic firms benefit,
but only to the extent that a common disclosure standard prevails. To be
sure, this protection does not attract the foreign issuer to the U.S. market,
but it is a regulatory cost that it must bear, and from which U.S. issuers
benefit, so long as U.S. legal standards are mandatory for all listed compa-
nies.
These observations need to be generalized in terms of this Article's
earlier analysis of concentrated versus dispersed ownership patterns. Fun-
damentally, blockholder systems of concentrated ownership and the Anglo-
American system of dispersed ownership represent highly inconsistent ap-
arguable that only foreign issuers will be subject to such wider spreads, as both dealers and investors
discount only these stocks. But this exclusive focus on stock price ignores the impact of tolerating in-
sider trading in some cases on the behavior of potential future inside traders. Once it becomes possible
to trade some U.S. listed stocks based on nonpublic, "inside" information, the temptation grows to use
such information in the case of domestic issuers as well. In effect, the prohibition loses its moral force,
and an increased rate of violations becomes predictable.
203 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BRooK. L. REv.
763 (1995) (stressing that disclosure to the market also implies disclosure of proprietary plans to com-
petitors).
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proaches to corporate governance, even if it is arguable that they are equally
efficient. Blockholder systems attempt to subsidize the cost of effective
monitoring of management by offering the blockholder the practical ability
to engage in forms of self-dealing and insider trading that are anathema to
market-centered systems of dispersed ownership.2 4 Whatever the wisdom
of this approach, the listing of the minority shares of such blockholder-
dominated companies on U.S. exchanges essentially introduces firms that
tolerate opportunism by the blockholder into a population of firms that have
traditionally closely policed this same controlling shareholder relationship.
The result is to marry the square peg with the round hole-unless the mar-
ket-centered system's policy of protecting minority rights is extended to
apply to blockholder-dominated companies. In this light, the most impor-
tant network externality associated with the U.S. and U.K. systems of mar-
ket-centered dispersed ownership is the sense of trust and confidence that
investors have developed over decades of experience and with thousands of
listed securities. In principle, trust grows as the number of listings on the
exchange increase because this deepens the investors' experiential base, but
it is subject to injury if new listings will disrupt and contradict that prior
experience. In short, "high-trust" markets are injured by the introduction of
"low-trust" firms.
In truth, the forces that encourage the development of trust and coop-
eration may transcend purely legal forces, 20 5 but the existence of strong le-
gal protections seems an excellent proxy for these forces. Indeed, where
legal forces exist to protect the minority shareholder, an institutional and
cultural infrastructure--composed of such important actors as security
analysts, rating agencies, and business journalists-soon follows. Ulti-
mately, trust is a learned behavior for investors, and their common experi-
ence, which teaches them that trust in management is efficient, may be
based on a composite of legal and social forces. But for precisely this rea-
son, a market cannot simultaneously trade high-trust U.S. and U.K. firms
and low-trust European and Asian firms without the investors' unsatisfac-
tory experience with the latter creating skepticism of the former. In short,
some spillover is inevitable.0 6
A final, related consideration involves the political economy underly-
ing securities markets--and, more specifically, how the existing political
consensus that supports trust could quickly unravel if foreign and domestic
issuers were subject to markedly different disclosure standards. Clearly,
compliance with higher U.S. disclosure standards imposes real costs on
204 See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
205 For a fuller discussion of the role of trust in firms, markets, and organizations, see Rafael La
Porta et al., Trust in Large Organizations, 87 AM. ECON. REv. 333 (1997).
206 Thus, even a foreign, blockholder-dominated firm whose minority shares trade at a greatly dis-
counted price erodes trust when it enters into a deal or transaction that subsidizes its blockholders at the
expense of public shareholders.
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U.S. issuers and may also at times compel them to disclose proprietary in-
formation that they would prefer not to reveal to their business competi-
tors.2°7 Against this backdrop, assume that the SEC were to permit foreign
issuers to list in the United States without complying with U.S. standards.
At this point, the political reaction of domestic issuers seems obvious: why,
they would ask, should they be subject to higher costs and greater competi-
tive injury when their international competitors were permitted to sell secu-
rities in the United States based on a less demanding standard? In effect,
permitting foreign issuers to abide only by foreign standards concedes that
investor protection concerns do not require more. Once the SEC makes
such a concession, its negotiating position vis-A-vis domestic issuers would
be seriously compromised. Hence, accepting any significant disparity in
disclosure standards for one market creates an unstable environment in
which political pressures are likely to produce regulatory arbitrage-and the
proverbial "race to the bottom."
3. Strong Managers and Dispersed Ownership.-As earlier noted, the
"political" theory of corporate finance explains dispersed ownership as
largely the result of legal constraints that (in the U.S. context) impeded the
natural development of financial intermediaries; in contrast, the newer "le-
gal" hypothesis views dispersed ownership as the consequence of Anglo-
American law's success in protecting minority shareholder. But the legal
hypothesis is relatively vague about just what the specific legal differences
are that protect minority investors in the Anglo-American context.
The recent history of privatization in the transitional economies of
Eastern Europe provides, however, a natural experiment that shows the in-
stability of dispersed ownership in a legal regime that does little to protect
minority investors. In several of these countries, shares in the newly pri-
vatized firms were broadly distributed through a technique known as
"voucher privatization" that essentially distributed the shares gratuitously
among all adult citizens.08 In the Czech Republic, where minority protec-
tions were the weakest, dispersed ownership proved short-lived; controlling
blocks were quickly assembled, the minority shares lost much of their
value, and the trading market for such shares largely vanished.209 This ex-
207 This point that disclosure to the market also means disclosure to one's competitors and can result
in competitive injuries has been stressed by Professor Edmund Kitch. See Kitch, supra note 203.
208 For a review of the very different Czech and Polish experiences with voucher privatization, see
John C. Coffee, Jr., Inventing a Corporate Monitorfor Transitional Economics: The Uncertain Lessons
from the Czech and Polish Experiences, in COMPARATIVE ConpoRATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE oF
THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH 68-138 (Klaus Hopt et al. eds., 1998).
209 See id. at 111-38. In 1995, the Prague Stock Exchange had 1,716 listings; by early 1999, this
number had fallen by more than 80% to 301 listings, and it was estimated that fewer than a dozen of
these enjoyed any liquidity. See Peter S. Green, Prague Exchange's Failed Reform Efforts Leaves Some
Predicting Its Demise, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 17, 1999, at 16. Correspondingly, over the same pe-
riod, the value of an investment in an index of the leading 50 stocks on the Prague Stock Exchange
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perience supports a simple generalization: the greatest danger facing a dis-
persed shareholder is the "theft" of their share value incident to a rapid as-
sembly of a controlling block. In a nontransparent market, the dispersed
shareholder is inherently vulnerable and does not know whether to sell at
the first sign of a potential control acquisition or to hold out for a higher
price.
In contrast, in the classic Berle-Means corporation, with its separation
of ownership and control, strong mangers are in a position to "protect" the
dispersed shareholders from any creeping acquisition of control that does
not afford all shareholders a roughly equal opportunity to share in the con-
trol premium. In addition, legal rules in both the United States and the
United Kingdom protect the dispersed shareholder from the "creeping" ac-
quisition of control without the payment of a control premium. Perhaps
more importantly, managers themselves have only weak incentives to buy
control because they are already undiversified and hence should rationally
be risk-averse about further investments in their firm. In addition, U.S. law
closely regulates "going private" transactions. But if management does not
want to buy the firm, they also do not want outsiders to assemble a control-
ling block. To be sure, such "protection" may well result in managerial en-
trenchment, as self-interested managers resist all third party offers. Still,
the ultimate tradeoff is uncertain: "strong managers" may protect dispersed
shareholders from non-pro rata attempts to "steal" the firm's control pre-
mium, but they also may entrench themselves, resisting even generous ten-
der offers for all the firm's stock. This explanation can also provide a
further reason for migration to U.S. securities markets: firms facing the
gradual dissipation of a control block, including a control holder who
wishes to sell, may prefer the U.S. market where managers can better hope
to resist the sudden formation of a new control block.
In general, a management that does not hold a controlling equity posi-
tion may be the dispersed shareholders' principal protection against theft of
the control premium. To be sure, this protection comes at a price, but it
also explains why dispersed ownership is a stable, persistent phenomenon
in the Anglo-American context, while dispersed share ownership has
proved to be only a temporary stage in transitional economies. By insisting
upon the manager's fiduciary duty to the firm, a concept unknown to civil
law, Anglo-American law restricts the ability of the firm's management to
acquire control of the firm at a price below fair value. In so doing, common
law legal regimes also give management a strong incentive to resist outsid-
ers who would similarly assemble a control block. The net result is a system
of checks and balances that permits dispersed ownership to persist. In this
light, the key difference between "common law" and "civil law" legal re-
would have fallen by over 60%. See id. (noting decline of PX-50 index from 1,000 to 371). In contrast,
the Polish experience appears to have been different and dispersed ownership has been more stable, in
part because it was far more difficult to assemble a controlling block under its legal rules.
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gimes may be less the statutory protections than the ability given to a
"strong" management to fend off outside control seekers.
E. The Centrality of Securities Regulation
This Article has said little about state corporate law, because it believes
that the critical restraints that most limit agency costs are today contained in
the federal securities laws.21° To be sure, the constraints in federal and state
law may redundantly overlap, but as a result the federal securities laws so
overshadow state corporate law as to make the distinctions among state
laws relatively unimportant in the case of the publicly held corporation, at
least with regard to the goal of limiting agency costs. 211 Interestingly, this
is basically what Canadian scholars have reported about corporate charter
competition in Canada.212
The immediate significance of this assessment that federal law has
overshadowed state law variations lies principally in its implications for
foreign issuers. Even if some foreign jurisdictions do grant controlling
shareholders the discretionary power to take self-interested actions, this dis-
cretion may be significantly constrained by federal securities regulation. In
short, the much discussed differences between the protections given by An-
glo-American law versus Continental European law may be overshadowed
by the legal protections implicit either in the U.S. securities law or in a
"harmonized" international system of securities regulation. Although these
disparities in the scope of securities regulations would be more significant
than the variations among state law on corporate duties within the United
States, these disparities may also be reduced or neutralized by the threat of
both SEC and private enforcement in U.S. courts.
Is such a Pax Americana truly possible? Concededly, it is probably
premature to predict that U.S. courts will fully enforce the provisions of
U.S. securities law against foreign controlling persons of a foreign corpora-
210 Of course, state law regulates the simplest forms of fiduciary abuse: unfair self-dealing, excess
compensation, usurpation of corporate opportunities. But these forms of misconduct rarely have a mate-
rial impact on share price. In contrast, federal law more directly regulates corporate control transactions
that could more severely injure minority shareholders.
211 No other commentator to my knowledge has made this argument, but there is recognition that
state corporate law has become virtually uniform across the states. See Camey, supra note 37, at 717.
Where variations among states may have greater significance is in reducing transaction costs; this is
both outside the fiduciary duty context and largely unaffected by the federal securities laws. Although
novel, my thesis has a historical foundation. Professor Mahoney has argued that the original purpose of
both the U.S. and U.K. securities laws was to reduce the capacity of promoters and insiders to overreach
public shareholders. See Mahoney, supra note 36. In that light, this Article's claim is simply that the
SEC has substantially succeeded. For earlier assessments of the requirements of federal securities law
that implicitly find them as important as state fiduciary duties in preventing misconduct by controlling
persons, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1483-
85 (1989); Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1 (1993).
212 See Daniels, supra note 33, at 182-84 (because Canadian securities administrators could in effect
countermand provincial law, charter competition among the provinces has not developed).
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tion. The strain on the enforcement capacity of the SEC would be consid-
erable in the case of some norms, but not others. 213 Perhaps U.S. law will
never be zealously enforced in the case of companies that simply allow
some small percentage of their stock to drift into the hands of shareholders
in the United States. Still, for the truly large firm that enters the U.S. secu-
rities markets in a major way, this entry is probably irreversible as a practi-
cal matter, as U.S. shareholders cannot easily be expelled or squeezed out at
low cost. With such entry will predictably come a substantial degree of
functional convergence.
F. Markets Versus States: Does the Experience with State Charter
Competition Have Relevance to the Prospect for Convergence?
Few topics have been as extensively debated in the area of corporate
law as the claim that corporate chartering competition results in a more effi-
cient body of corporate law.2 14 Proponents of the view that charter compe-
tition produces a "race to the top" have recently argued that a competitive
market for securities law should be similarly encouraged by permitting is-
suers to choose the apglicable jurisdiction whose securities laws would ap-
ply to their activities. But are the two contexts truly analogous?
This Article has suggested that convergence at the level of securities
regulation will outpace convergence at the level of corporate law. In es-
sence, this is a prediction that international events will follow the de facto
outcome of the U.S. charter competition experience. One reason for this
prediction is that the forces that have produced a dominant supplier of cor-
porate law at the state level, Delaware, have even greater impact in the in-
temational arena of securities regulation and thus make it even more likely
that U.S. securities markets will become the dominant supplier of law for
large publicly held corporations.
To understand this contention, it is useful to start with an obvious point
that most commentators have largely ignored, namely, that virtually all
publicly held corporations are regulated at two distinct levels: (1) their ju-
risdiction of incorporation, and (2) the various jurisdictions where their se-
curities trade. This system of dual regulation applies not only to Delaware
corporations trading on the New York Stock Exchange, but equally to Japa-
nese corporations trading on the London Stock Exchange.
216
213 For example, it may be very costly to enforce Section 13(d)'s notion of a voting group against
European individuals and firms that form voting alliances without disclosure. See supra notes 155-61
and accompanying text. Still, more visible transactions (such as "going private" transactions or voting
rights recapitalizations) could be more easily monitored.
214 For the principal contending positions, see supra note 32.
215 See Choi & Guzman, supra note 195, at 930-34; Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A
Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998).
216 Adding further complexity is the fact that there is a third potential source of regulation: the rules
of the securities exchange(s) on which the issuer's stock trades. For the moment, this complexity can be
deferred.
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The nature of the competition at these various levels differs, however,
dramatically. Proponents of a market for corporate charters have modeled
charter competition as simply a contest among different jurisdictions offer-
ing their laws as a product that the issuer, as consumer, chooses from
among many in a competitive marketplace.2 17 Delaware, a small state, can
thus outcompete New York or California, much larger states, if it offers a
superior product. Indeed, as a small state, Delaware can make a more
credible commitment that it will not change its law in the future adversely
to the firms incorporating in Delaware, because the corporate franchise tax
revenue it would thereby risk means more to it proportionately than it
would to a larger state.2 18 But at the level of securities regulation, the com-
peting jurisdictions are not simply marketing a product, legal rules; rather,
they are also offering the issuer access to markets of varying size, which ac-
cess is tied to acceptance of the jurisdiction's legal rules. Thus, a small ju-
risdiction, such as Switzerland or Delaware, cannot as easily compete on
equal terms with larger jurisdictions, such as the United States or New
York, if the legal rules so offered do not carry with them access to securities
markets. In short, Delaware or Switzerland could not become the predomi-
nant supplier of legal rules in the securities regulation context-unless the
larger jurisdictions decided to relinquish their control by allowing access to
their markets based simply on issuers complying with the law of some other
jurisdiction.
Put differently, regulatory arbitrage works only to the extent that the
party regulated can freely choose the law applicable to it, typically, by rein-
corporating in a less regulated jurisdiction. But, in securities regulation, it
is not an attractive option for the issuer to flee a regulated jurisdiction if the
issuer thereby also flees the principal market for its securities. For exam-
ple, few issuers would willingly move from the New York Stock Exchange
to the Milan Stock Exchange in the same manner that they might switch
their jurisdiction of incorporation from New York to Delaware.
Of course, in theory, U.S. law could provide that any foreign issuer
that complied with the disclosure rules of its home jurisdiction could sell its
securities in the United States. Such a reciprocal system is in fact close to
what the harmonization process has essentially wrought in Europe.21 9 Still,
little reason exists for the United States effectively to surrender control over
domestic trading within its borders in such a fashion. In Europe, harmoni-
zation was a necessary step to the creation of pan-European trading and
217 See generally Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.
L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985).
218 For Delaware, corporate franchise tax revenue has consistently averaged 16.7% of Delaware's
total tax revenues. See Romano, supra note 215, at 2389. The potential tax revenues to the United
States (or the SEC) from attracting foreign issuers to list in U.S. markets are trivial by comparison.
219 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. Of course, under the EC model, each jurisdiction
must have disclosure standards meeting some minimum level. Hence, the system is not simply a recip-
rocal one.
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stock markets having sufficient size and scale to be efficient. Not only is
this not so in the United States, but the United States also lacks the eco-
nomic motive that animates Delaware to seek to attract foreign corpora-
tions: namely, the prospect of increased corporate franchise revenues and
hence reduced state taxes on its citizens. Because U.S. tax revenues are not
meaningfully affected by foreign listings, U.S. regulators have less reason
to engage in regulatory competition.
In any event, from a bureaucratic perspective, the occasions are rare on
which a regulatory agency has voluntarily ceded control without some
compelling need that required such a surrender. The usual assumptions of
political science are that public agencies act to maximize their powers, just
as private firms seek to maximize revenues or profits. Indeed, for the last
decade, the SEC has steadfastly resisted any reciprocal prospectus system
under which foreign issuers could issue securities in the United States based
on their home country's disclosure standards and has instead insisted on a
harmonization that would largely replicate U.S. standards.220
Assuming then that the United States will not lightly open its markets
to foreign issuers who do not comply with U.S. disclosure standards (either
current standards or some future harmonized standards), what does this
conclusion imply for the likely course of international convergence at the
securities regulation level? Here, the data from the U.S. experience with
charter competition becomes very relevant and supports three basic gener-
alizations.
First, the best documented finding in the empirical literature on the
U.S. corporate chartering competition is that a high degree of uniformity
has emerged in American corporate laws. One recent careful study con-
cludes that "American corporate law is relatively uniform across the
states.2 21 In essence, this is a conclusion that competition works and that,
at least among U.S. jurisdictions, path dependent forces have not impeded
that competition materially. Much the same could happen on the securities
regulation level. Even if a German corporation cannot reincorporate out-
side Germany, it can certainly sell its securities outside of Germany. Thus,
competition among jurisdictions and markets can develop at the securities
regulation level, and by analogy it should similarly produce a high level of
uniformity.
Second, recent commentators have argued that the U.S. market for cor-
porate law is imperfectly competitive, with Delaware possessing market
power and competitive advantages that other jurisdictions cannot repli-
cate.222 When the advantages that give Delaware market power and a
dominant position are closely examined, however, they prove to be even
220 For a review of this debate, see Geiger, supra note 82; Lowenstein, supra note 105.
221 See Carney, supra note 37, at 717.
222 See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 1908 (1998).
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more present in the case of the U.S. capital markets. For example, some ar-
gue that the key advantage possessed by Delaware in the competition for
corporate charters is that of network externalities, 223 and, as earlier argued,
this is also a key advantage of the U.S. securities markets.
Another factor that could confer dominance on the largest and most
popular exchange is "herding."'' 4 Corporations may prefer to locate in a
popular jurisdiction of incorporation for reasons that are simply based on its
popularity, not the inherent superiority of its law. Such a "safe" decision
protects the corporation's advisers from criticism, pleases uninformed
shareholders who assume it is correct, and produces no adverse reaction
from a marketplace that cannot easily evaluate legal differences and so pre-
fers the consensus choice.225 But again, this point applies at least equally to
long-established capital markets that already possess substantial reputa-
tional capital. Listing on such a market is a safe decision that will not invite
criticism. Hence, migration of the largest firms to the largest marketplace
seems logical, both because of network externalities and because of the
phenomenon of low-risk herding. Other markets cannot easily compete
away the "first mover" advantages enjoyed the U.S. markets. Although
other markets may be less regulated, lesser regulation may scare potential
investors to the same degree that it attracts potential issuers. The tradeoff is
indeterminate.
Finally, the U.S. experience with charter competition suggests one last
implication: once one jurisdiction becomes dominant, other jurisdictions
may.not seek to compete with it on a head-to-head basis but may instead
seek to specialize and differentiate themselves by marketing different legal
products. Thus, some commentators have suggested that, once Delaware
became the dominant jurisdiction of incorporation, other states began to
specialize and focus their corporate laws on smaller, privately held firms
that lacked dispersed ownership in order to retain these smaller firms or at-226
tract similar firms to their jurisdiction. Such specialization could simi-
larly characterize the international competition among securities markets, as
firms with concentrated ownership might seek to list only on non-U.S. mar-
kets. Some foreign markets would specialize in serving such controlled
firms, while the U.S. markets might offer their services principally to firms
with dispersed ownership. If so, the market power of the U.S. exchange
would not be seriously challenged.
These conclusions lead to a more general hypothesis: the greater the
likelihood that the predominance of U.S. capital markets will persist be-
223 See id. at 1923-27; see also Klausner, supra note 198, at 842-47.
27A For a general discussion of herding, see David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior
and Investment, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 465 (1990).
225 See Kamar, supra note 222, at 1923-27.
226 See Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the
Firm, 28 J.L. & ECON. 179 (1985); see also Daniels, supra note 33, at 138-40.
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cause of the foregoing "first mover" advantages, the less that U.S. regula-
tors need to fear regulatory arbitrage. Foreign issuers will pay some price
in increased regulation in order to obtain the advantages of the dominant
market. Commentators have suggested that Delaware extracts exactly this
advantage from its position as the dominant jurisdiction in order to benefit
local interest groups.227 At the securities regulation level, the SEC could
correspondingly exploit the dominance of U.S. markets to protect the dis-
persed shareholder-who is after all the key constituent that the SEC has
long sought to benefit.
Predictably, those who favor regulatory arbitrage and interjurisdic-
tional competition will reply that this position makes the SEC a "monopo-
list" able to impose its rules and regulations on foreign issuers. 228 At least
at the level of international securities regulation, this is demonstrably false:
other strong international competitors exist and more may soon arise. The
London Stock Exchange is the most obvious example,2 29 but the prospect of
a pan-European securities exchange now seems increasingly likely. Still,
even in the face of significant competition from the London Stock Ex-
change, foreign listings on the New York Stock Exchange have tripled
during this decade.20 Given the evident choice and the resulting migration
to U.S. exchanges, the need to lower U.S. standards to "meet the competi-
tion" seems nonexistent.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Paradigms shift and often quickly. At the beginning of this decade,
scholars fashioned a "political" theory of corporate finance, largely to ac-
count for the restrictions placed by U.S. law on institutional activism. With
the increasing evidence that newly privatized economies have been unable
to establish viable securities markets, another, more recent group of schol-
ars has focused on the dichotomy between dispersed and concentrated own-
ership and concluded that legal protections for minority shareholders are the
critical variable that underlies the growth of viable securities markets. This
Article has suggested that, within the U.S. context, the critical protections
for the dispersed shareholder are principally found in the federal securities
laws, particularly those provisions regulating corporate control transac-
tions.231
227 See Macey & Miller, supra note 32, at 491-98 (1987); see also Kamar, supra note 222, at 1924.
228 This has been the claim of those who wish to substitute state securities regulation for federal
regulation. See Romano, supra note 215, at 2361.
29 For recent discussions of the London Stock Exchange's strong competitive position and its re-
cent linkage to the Deutsche Borse, see Meg Carter, Competition is Hotting Up in the Staid World of the
Stock Market, TIMES (London), July 24, 1998, at 38; Lea Paterson, Don't Write Off the City Just Yet,
News Analysis: London Can Fend Off Attacks on its Financial Leadership, INDEPENDENT (London),
June 24, 1998, at 18.
230 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 149-83 and accompanying text.
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Although some synthesis of these "political" and "legal" theories of
dispersed ownership is ultimately likely, the two theories diverge sharply in
their predictions about the likelihood of corporate convergence. While the
"political" theorists argue that the forces of path dependency are unlikely to
be overcome, the "legal" hypothesis suggests that a legal regime that pro-
tects public shareholders has important long-term competitive advantages
and will attract corporate migrants 12 This Article has sought to reshape
this debate by emphasizing that functional convergence can occur (and is
arriving) at the level of securities regulation, even while corporate law con-
vergence has been largely frustrated. Some will fear and others will ap-
plaud the prospect of "stealth" convergence, but it is already at the doorstep.
This leads to the ultimate normative question: should we welcome or
fear convergence? The efficiency implications of convergence are fairly
obvious. If, as suggested, the U.S. system of securities regulation not only
specifies a marginally higher standard of disclosure,2 3 but directly seeks to
reduce agency costs and control opportunism, three principal efficiency
gains should result from this transition: (1) harmonization of disclosure
standards promises substantial savings in transaction costs and increased
comparability of issuers, with consequent gains for investors and greater
access to capital markets worldwide for issuers; 2 a and (2) greater legal
controls on the power of insiders and controlling shareholders should
reduce agency costs and increase the ability of foreign firms to sell their
shares in public markets; 235 and (3) access to the public equity markets
should permit issuers to undertake longer-term and higher risk investments,
thereby generating economic growth. This prospect of real economic
232 Two advantages have been recurrently stressed in this Article: (1) securities markets facilitate
investment in longer-run, higher risk projects that advance technological growth and productivity, see
sources cited supra notes 25, 81; and (2) in a world of consolidating mergers, firms with high stock
prices for their public shares are likely to be the survivors.
233 It seems generally recognized that U.S. disclosure standards are more rigorous than those of any
other country with the possible exception of Canada. Even the United Kingdom's standards require less
line of business data and do not require discussion of management-identified trends that may affect the
firm's future liquidity, capital needs or operating results. See David H. Landau, Note, SECProposals to
Facilitate Multinational Securities Offerings: Disclosure Requirements in the United States and United
Kingdom, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 457,459-68 (1987).
234 These points have been made in great detail by a number of authors. See Geiger, supra note 200;
Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulation Competition, Externalization and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 47, 66-67 (1993); White, supra note 200, at 39.
235 Some respond that reduction in agency costs is an illusory efficiency gain, because dispersed
ownership is the source of most agency costs. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 13, at 12-13. This
response focuses only on the agency costs of controlling management and ignores the agency costs of
preventing non-pro-rata distributions to controlling blockholders. While this issue may well remain
theoretically indeterminate, the extraordinary size of control premiums in some European markets, see
Zingales, supra note 29, suggests that public shareholders lose more from this form of opportunism than
from fiduciary misconduct by management.
236 See Levine & Zervos, supra note 25; Rejan & Zingales, supra note 81. Others have argued that
legal underdevelopment prevents a national economy from being able to credibly commit to controlling
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growth means that the gains from this transition will flow not only to share-
holders, but their national economies as well.
Beyond these efficiency arguments, there is still an independent nor-
mative claim that facilitating dispersed ownership would produce desirable
social and political consequences. In the absence of legal protections for
the minority shareholders, investors depend on relationships, not law. The
result is a system of relationship-based investing that at its worst can be
characterized as "crony capitalism." Such relationship-based systems may
be necessary in transitional economics where the contracting system re-
mains at an early and primitive stage, but relationship-based systems of
governance essentially misallocate capital and result in a highly stratified
and hierarchical economic system which discourages entrepreneurs.
2 7
Concededly, European governance systems have never been characterized
by the corruption or legal anarchy endemic to Asia, but they have tended
toward a hierarchical and centrally dominated structure that is a barrier to
new entrants and entrepreneurship at a time when growth in economic pro-
ductivity is being driven by such actors and forces. Encouraging equity
markets to develop and encouraging dispersed ownership may therefore
imply not only efficiency gains but also a more open society, one less
dominated by banks and centralized financial intermediaries and one more
attractive to entrepreneurship. This "social hypothesis" about the conse-
quences of providing legal protections for minority shareholders is specula-
tive, but it may ultimately prove more important than the efficiency gains.
If the transition to dispersed ownership is desirable, it implies that U.S.
securities regulation should not exempt the foreign issuer who actively en-
ters U.S. trading markets from those forms of regulation that seek to reduce
agency costs. In addition, it suggests that current U.S. rules may need to be
strengthened. Here, U.S. law faces an important transition problem. Tradi-
tionally, U.S. securities law has struck a compromise with the foreign issuer
that lists on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ, requiring it to enter the periodic
disclosure system of the Exchange Act, but, exempting it from the proxy
rules and certain other provisions of the Act.Y25 In time, this will become an
increasingly strained compromise. Why, for example, should Daimler con-
tinue to be exempt from U.S. proxy rules when possibly the majority of its
beneficial shareholders are U.S. citizens? To be sure, sensible distinctions
can be drawn: foreign issuers have also long been exempt from the "short
opportunism and hence retards economic growth. See Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, supra note 7. In
this light, migration to foreign securities markets or international securities harmonization can be viewed
as a "second-best' but politically feasible solution by which firm growth and national economic pros-
perity can still be pursued.
237 For this view (as applied to the Asian financial crisis), see Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales,
Which Capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian Crisis, 11 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 40 (1998).
238 SEC Rule 3a12-3(b) exempts foreign private issuers from Sections 14(a), 14(b), 14(c), 14(f) and
16 of the 1934 Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3(b) (1998).
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swing" profit provisions of section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 9 and this
exemption makes continuing sense because section 16(b) is a prophylactic
rule that would be a trap for unwary foreign shareholders, and probably
could not be evenly enforced in the case of foreign issuers. In contrast, the
proxy rules go to the heart of corporate governance and to the purposes un-
derlying migration to U.S. markets as a form of bonding.
Ultimately, this Article has advanced two claims that are novel only to
the academic world: law matters, and trust is efficient. Protecting the ex-
pectations of the minority may be the essential prerequisite to an effective
securities market. Still, the future as here predicted does not entail the in-
evitable triumph of the Berle and Means corporation with its dispersed
ownership and strong management. The contemporary systems of dis-
persed and concentrated ownership are like giant tectonic plates, grating
against each other. One may push and even override the other, but where
they meet the primary prospect is for fiction. The best way to minimize
that friction is to encourage a global process of self-selection and migration.
Those firms seeking to grow in size to a global scale are likely to elect into
the "higher" governance standards already largely observed in the United
States, and such bonding should minimize the social friction and even un-
rest that formal convergence could cause.
Ultimately, just as securities regulation has over the last thirty years
dominated substantive corporate law in the United States, so too may the
law of securities markets effectively overshadow local substantive law on a
global basis, at least in the case of the largest public corporations. History
may be beginning to repeat itself.
239 see id.
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